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ARKANSAS'S TRADITION OF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL
ACTIVISM AND THE ASCENDANCY OF THE ARKANSAS SUPREME
COURT
Jerald A. Sharum*
REGNAT POPULUS-"THE PEOPLE RULE"
STATE MOTTO OF ARKANSAS
I. INTRODUCTION
Some have recently opined that the use of state constitutional law is
still in its infancy in Arkansas.' Indeed, it is apparent that, unlike most other
states in the modem era, Arkansas's highest court has not been a great
source of new constitutional law-except, perhaps, until very recently. a
Instead, the people of Arkansas have traditionally been the true masters of
constitutional law as the source of governmental authority and as direct and
frequent participants in the development of constitutional law through the
amendment process.
3
In fact, throughout the history of Arkansas the people have used
constitutional amendments passed through ballot initiatives to vigilantly
modify the restrictions on state government as well as the specific levels of
protection afforded to individuals by the Arkansas Constitution.4 Through
this hands-on approach, the people of Arkansas have attempted to ensure
that the government does not go too far afield from the will of the people by
helping to create a constitutional framework that allows the people to
provide all of the protections and government limitations that they require
* Editor-in-Chief, HogLaw.org. Albany Law School, J.D., 2008; Editor-in-Chief
(2006-2007), Albany Law Review; Nelson A. Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and
Policy, University at Albany, State University of New York, M.A., Public Affairs and Policy,
2008; University of Arkansas-Fayetteville, B.A., Classical Studies, 2004.
1. Robert F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism Takes Root in Arkansas, 58 ARK. L.
Rnv. 883, 886-87 (2006) (arguing that the emergence of state constitutional law as a means
to protect individual rights independent from the Federal Constitution only began in Arkansas
following the Arkansas Supreme Court's 2002 decision in State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 74
S.W.3d 215 (2002)).
2. Id. at 886.
3. This is in contrast to the role of the people in other state constitutions that merely
establish the people as the theoretical source of governmental authority. See, e.g., N.Y.
CONST. pmbl. By contrast, the Arkansas Constitution was not only established by the power
of the people, it also was established to expressly vest all political power with the people.
Compare id., and ARK. CONST. pmbl., with ARK. CONST. art. II, § 1.
4. See infra Part II.
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without waiting for or wanting the courts or the legislature to do it for them.
I term this brand of active participation in constitutional law as popular
constitutional activism.
5
This tradition, however, appears to be changing. Over the last forty
years, the level of the people's participation has markedly declined, falling
from its highest levels in the 1950s to its lowest levels in the years leading to
2006.6 As this period also generally corresponds to what I argue is the
increasing role that the Arkansas Supreme Court has taken in state
constitutional law and the political forum, I ask the following question: to
what extent has Arkansas's tradition of popular constitutional activism been
affected by this changing role? I conclude that the ascendancy of the
Arkansas Supreme Court negatively affected7 Arkansas's long history of,
but decreasing reliance in, popular involvement in the constitutional process
by providing an alternative means of controlling state action and depressing
the use of the people's primary instrument for effecting constitutional
change: the popular initiative.
To reach these conclusions, the remainder of this article presents a
three-part analysis that systematically examines the impact that the Arkansas
Supreme Court has had on Arkansas's tradition of popular constitutional
activism. First, Part II of this article describes the development of popular
constitutional activism from its earliest beginnings during the genesis of
Arkansas's current constitution in 1874 to the use of initiative-based
constitutional amendments in the modem era as an essential instrument of
constitutional change. Next, Part III statistically quantifies the entire
development of popular constitutional activism from 1912 to 2006 and
specifically examines the period from 1984 to 2006 to extract information
5. Popular constitutional activism is not an oxymoron. Although many detractors of
constitutional activism have defined "activism" as actions, principally by the courts, that
deviate from majoritarian social norms, I do not use the activism term of art in that way. See,
e.g., Daniel Kiel, Hypocrisy Rules in Legislating from the Bench, COM. APPEAL (Memphis,
Tenn.), Jan. 12, 2006, at B5. Constitutional activism, at its base, is simply the use of a
constitution to an end. I intentionally articulate this term using this rather generic definition
because of the negative connotation that constitutional activism has taken in legal literature
and popular culture over the past thirty years in part because of the antimajoritarian impact
(or anti-individual impact depending on your point of view) that constitutional activism,
particularly vis-A-vis "judicial activism," is believed to have. My focus here is not to
examine constitutional activism in any broader context than that of exploring how the people
of Arkansas have uniquely and actively used and continue to use their constitution.
6. See infra Part II.B.3-4.
7. In the context of the statistical analysis presented in this article, unless otherwise
stated, positive and negative characterizations only reflect the mathematical relationship
between popular constitutional activism and the factor or factors that affect it. Thus, a
positive relationship simply means that an increase in the factor relates to an increase in
popular constitutional activism (and vice versa), and a negative relationship means that an
increase in the factor relates to a decrease in popular constitutional activism.
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related to the impact of the Arkansas Supreme Court's increasing role in
Arkansas's state constitutional process. Finally, Part IV of this article
examines the Arkansas Supreme Court's ascendancy into the state
constitutional process during the last four decades to provide a causal
explanation for why popular constitutional activism has declined over time.
II. THE RISE OF THE PEOPLE AS MASTERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW8
Arkansas, like all other states, has a constitution that defines the scope
of the state government's power and fundamental rights enjoyed by the
people. Unlike in many if not most other states, however, the participation
of the people in Arkansas has extended far beyond merely adopting a static
constitution and allowing state courts to organically develop state
constitutional jurisprudence from that core document or relying on the
legislature to propose amendments to it.9 Although Arkansas courts have
certainly had occasion to interpret Arkansas's state constitutional law, the
people have historically taken an active role in both developing Arkansas's
current constitution and continuing to amend that constitution in the years
that followed by way of initiative-based amendments.
I argue that in analyzing Arkansas's modem constitutional tradition,
which has seen no wholesale constitutional revisions since 1874, the
incidence of these initiative-based amendments represent the best measure
of the level of popular constitutional activism expressed by the people. I
base this argument on four key characteristics of Arkansas's constitutional
tradition. First, the people specifically developed the current constitution to
center power with the Fpeople by imposing severe limitations on the powers
of state government.' Second, this allocation of power prevented the
government from being able to effectively function or meet the increasing
demands of a modern society." Third, constitutional amendments have
been the only way to allow the state government to attend to the people's
growing demands.12 And fourth, the people of Arkansas have actively and
frequently used their power to initiate constitutional amendments to meet
these demands independent of the legislature and, until recently, to a greater
extent than the courts.
1 3
8. For an excellent primer on Arkansas's political and constitutional history, see DIANE
D. BLAIR & JAY BARTH, ARKANSAS POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 2005).
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part II.A.1.
11. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
12. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
13. See infra Part II.B.
20091
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A. The Beginnings of Popular Constitutional Activism
Arkansas's modem constitutional traditions trace back to its fifth and
current constitution, the Constitution of 1874, because it provides the
framework for all subsequent development in state constitutional law. The
circumstances surrounding the 1874 Constitution's formation and the
motivations of its framers provide essential context to the subsequent
development of popular constitutional activism in Arkansas because of the
impact of the constitution's limitations on the powers and operations of
government and the government's corresponding inability to meet the needs
of modem society as a result of those limitations. Moreover, this context
appears to inform the view of Arkansans on their role over the government,
especially with respect to controlling the latter directly through
constitutional amendment. For "[firaming a... constitution does not
merely limit the power of government; rather it is a positive expression of
the people's values, goals, and aspirations."' 4 I will therefore begin our
story with a review of Arkansas's constitutional history.
1. A Primer on Arkansas's Constitutional History
Prior to the 1874 Constitution, popular rule was hardly the norm in
Arkansas. Yet, the beginnings of popular participation in the state
constitutional process were evident even before Arkansas became a state. In
1833, some three years before Arkansas entered the Union, many Arkansans
were interested in Arkansas becoming a state. 15 There was also, however,
strong opposition at the time because the admission of Arkansas as a slave
state would unbalance the equal representation of slave states and nonslave
states in the United States Senate that was established by the Missouri
Compromise of 1821.16 As the people became impatient waiting for
Congress to begin the statehood process, "the territorial legislature passed a
bill providing for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention.'
7
Even though Arkansas's territorial governor refused to sign the act that
would authorize the convention, the convention was allowed to move
forward because the United States Attorney General recognized that the
right of the people to "assemble and to petition the government" included
the power to convene a constitutional convention. 18
14. Joshua Segev, Who Needs a Constitution? In Defense of the Non-decision
Constitution-making Tactic in Israel, 70 ALB. L. REv. 409,452 (2007).
15. KAY COLLETT Goss, THE ARKANSAS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 1
(1993).
16. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 8; Goss, supra note 15, at 1.




Energized by this newfound power, delegates were sent to Arkansas's
first Constitutional Convention in early 1836 and drafted the 1836
Constitution.' 9 Unlike later constitutions, the 1836 Constitution became
effective immediately upon Arkansas's admission to the Union later that
same year-and notably without a vote by the people. °
The 1836 Constitution was a general document styled after the Federal
Constitution.21 It did not contain the level of detailed and exacting
provisions for salaries, procedures, and taxation that would characterize the
221874 Constitution and its amendments. In the years following its
adoption, however, a number of amendments to the 1836 Constitution were
ratified that began to ever-so-slightly introduce more detail to such areas as
banking regulation, court and jurisdiction management, and judicial
elections.23 With these amendments, the 1836 Constitution made great
improvements to the State; the political system, on the other hand, remained
unstable because of the increasing stratification of power and the state's
increasing reliance on slavery.24
There were also concerns over the centralized control that had
developed with those already in power during this initial constitution-
making effort.25 A large portion of the population, mostly settlers in the
northern and western regions of Arkansas, feared that plantation owners in
the southern and eastern regions of Arkansas who controlled the state
government at the time would manipulate the process to keep themselves in
power.26 This not-so-quiet distrust of those in power has remained a staple
of Arkansas politics and a driving force in Arkansas's popular constitutional
activism.
In 1861, Arkansas adopted a new constitution as it joined the
Confederacy in civil war.27 This document contained essentially the same
general provisions as the 1836 Constitution with only relatively minor
revisions to safeguard the institution of slavery and to associate itself and
the state with the "Confederate States of America., 28 The tumultuous times
19. Id. at 1-2.
20. Id. at 2; Robert A. Leflar, A Survey of Arkansas' Constitutions, in ARKANSAS:
COLONY AND STATE 188, 189 (Leland DuVall ed., 1973).
21. See Robert A. Leflar, Arkansas-A Survey of Her Constitutions, ARK. GAZETTE, Oct.
19, 1969, at 1E.
22. See Goss, supra note 15, at 2.
23. Id. at 2-3.
24. See id at 3.
25. Id. at 2; see also Leflar, supra note 20, at 188.
26. Goss, supra note 15, at 2; see also Leflar, supra note 20, at 188.
27. Goss, supra note 15, at 3-4.
28. Id. at 4; see also BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 136.
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resulting from the Civil War left the people scrambling to retake control of
their state, both from the Confederates in power and from the federal
military rule that followed the Civil War, and return Arkansas to the
Union.29
Following President Lincoln's Amnesty Proclamation in 1863,
twenty-four counties sent delegates to Arkansas's third constitutional
convention. 30  The people overwhelmingly approved the convention's
proposed constitution in 1864 in an effort to re-enter the Union.3' Like the
1861 Constitution, the 1864 Constitution was nearly identical to the 1836
Constitution, containing few significant changes.32  In elections held
contemporaneously with the adoption of the 1864 Constitution, "pro-Union
supporters swept the election," ousting the Confederate powerful from
control of the State.33 At this point, although Arkansas had not yet been
readmitted to the Union, "[t]he state government appeared ethically
honest[,] .. . fiscally responsible," and ready to govern.34
The period of relative peace and progress following the adoption of the
1864 Constitution, however, was interrupted in 1867 when Congress passed
the Reconstruction Act.35 The Act dissolved the state governments of rebel
states and instituted federal military control.36 The federal government was
also empowered to "abolish, modify, control, [and] supersede" the Arkansas
state government until Arkansas adopted a "constitution of government in
conformity with the Constitution of the United States in all respects," was
admitted back into the Union, and was granted representation in Congress.37
In response, voters in Arkansas approved holding a fourth
constitutional convention in 1868 with the goal of "destroy[ing] white
supremacy and... weaken[ing] political leaders with Confederate ties."
38
The new constitution was approved in the spring of 1868, and Arkansas was
admitted back into the Union on June 22, 1868.' 9 Under this constitution,
the powers of government were expanded in many respects and articulated
in some detail.4 °
29. See generally Goss, supra note 15, at 4--6.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Id. at 4-5 (noting that the few significant changes included the abolition of slavery
and a declaration securing franchise rights for all males); BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at
136.
33. Goss, supra note 15, at 5.
34. Id. at 5-6.
35. Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
36. Id. § 6, 14 Stat. at 429.
37. Id. §§ 5-6, 14 Stat. at 429.
38. Goss, supra note 15, at 6.
39. Id. at 7.
40. See id. at 6-7. For example, "[m]any new offices were created, and a Governor was
given broad appointive power." Id. at 6. No money, however, could be spent out of the state
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Political infighting, however, soon led to a corrupt legislature and
outright abuses of power and financial irresponsibility. Kay Collett Goss
recounted some of these problems in her reference guide to the current
Arkansas Constitution:
The corrupt legislature spent millions of dollars on fictitious
railroads, levees, buildings that were never constructed, special
commissions, and phantom projects. The state debt thus increased
by 400 percent, with only a few public improvements to show for
the increased expenditures.
Tax assessors were appointed by the governor and were given a
percentage of the taxes levied as an incentive to raise assessments
levels.4'
Direct political power-grabs were also rampant during this period. For
example, after a state court ruled that the election of Elisha Baxter as
governor was invalid, Joseph Brooks occupied and fortified the state
capitol.42 The situation was resolved only when President Ulysses S. Grant
intervened and declared Baxter the governor.43 As a result of such abuses
and the high taxes characteristic of this period "spawned deep resentment[]"
in the people of Arkansas toward those who abuse their government power,
and as the government spun more and more out of control and away from
the needs of the people, the people increasingly "clamored for honest
administration, a new constitution, and a chance to gain control of their state
government." 44
This wide dissatisfaction manifested itself in Arkansas's fifth
constitutional convention, the Constitutional Convention of 1874, and would
result in the last major wholesale change in Arkansas's governing document,
namely, the passage of the Constitution of 1874. The Convention delegates
specifically focused their attention on the "areas most abused by the
treasury without an appropriation, and all bills that would raise state revenues would have to
come from each house of the General Assembly. Id. at 6-7. The state government was also
given the power to organize and restrict the financial affairs of local governments. Id.
41. Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Goss, supra note 15, at 7.
2009]
UALR LAW REVIEW
Radicals during... Reconstruction: taxation, elections, patronage, length of
terms, public credit, and debt."'
In adopting the new constitution, the generalized constitutions adopted
first in 1836 and then readopted in 1861 and 1864 were found to be
insufficient, in the view of the people, precisely because of their inability to
control government and, more importantly, government abuses against the
people. "[D]istrust of government was the theme," writes Goss of the 1874
Constitution, "and detailed provisions abounded to prevent
misunderstanding the convention's intentions to preclude the misuse of any
powers granted [to the government by the people].'6
Following thirty-eight tumultuous years of near-continuous
constitutional revision that saw four increasingly democratic constitutions
amid increasing levels of popular participation in the constitutional process,
the people of Arkansas overwhelmingly adopted the 1874 Constitution as a
final check on Reconstruction-era abuses by the government.47 In one broad
stroke, the power that had become so strongly centralized in Arkansas in the
elite and the powerful, and increasingly kept away from the people during
much of the nineteenth century leading up to the Reconstruction, was
broken apart.
The passage of the 1874 Constitution reflected the prevailing view at
the time that a "passive, low-tax, inactive state government was far
preferable to an interventionist and expensive one" that the people could not
control.48 This view continued well into the next century, but it gradually
began to shift as modem demands on government began to test the limits of
the 1874 Constitution.
2. Constitutional Baseline and the Limits of the 1874 Constitution
The limits imposed by the 1874 Constitution form the basis for the
second and third key characteristics of Arkansas's constitutional tradition
that makes the incidence of initiative-based amendments the best measure of
popular constitutional activism. Indeed, because of the limits imposed by
the 1874 Constitution's allocation of power, constitutional amendments
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. See BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 136-39 (noting that the 1874 Constitution was
authorized and ratified by the people by a vote of 76,453 to 24,807 and came as the people's
chosen solution to the abuses of power and unchecked wastes that characterized the years




were the only way to allow the state government to attend to the people's
growing needs.
This allocation of power has two principal features: tight controls
placed on the state government,49 and a limited power to change the
constitution needed to loosen those controls.50 These features found voice in
the 1874 Constitution as responses by the framers of the constitution to the
abuses of power and the widespread distrust of those in power that
characterized Arkansas's early constitutional history. 5' Moreover, the
framers used these features to center political power with the people and
situate the people as a check on the power of the state government and a key
player in the constitutional process.
a. The people's tight leash
The first key feature of the 1874 Constitution relevant to a discussion
of popular constitutional activism is the strict control that the people hold
over the government. This control is articulated in nineteen separate
articles, using 261 individual provisions and nearly 60,000 words.52 Indeed,
beginning with the first words of the 1874 Constitution, the people affirmed
the centrality of popular sovereignty and gave thanks for "the privilege of
choosing [their] own form of government., 53 The importance of the people
is even more forcefully declared in the first section of article II's declaration
of rights: "All political power is inherent in the people. 54 These themes
permeate each of the succeeding provisions of the Constitution.55
The first substantive article of the 1874 Constitution is article II, the
Declaration of Rights. As its designation would suggest, this article
49. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
50. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
51. See supra Part II.A.1.
52. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 138; Goss, supra note 15, at 8. While the 1874
Constitution contains nearly ten times the number of words of the Federal Constitution, it is
by no means the longest or the most detailed among state constitutions. BLAIR & BARTH,
supra note 8, at 138. For example, the current New York Constitution stretches across
twenty articles and contains over 180 active provisions. N.Y. CONST. New York's
constitution also covers in great detail many of the same areas as the Arkansas Constitution,
including provisions on individual rights, taxation, and the coordinate branches of
government. Id. That said, the level of detail and complexity of the Arkansas Constitution
are still remarkable, especially in light of the people's direct use of detailed and complex
restrictions on government through the amendment process.
53. ARK. CONST. pmbl.; see also Goss, supra note 15, at 25.
54. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 1.
55. By contrast, no real mention of the powers of government is made in the preamble or
the first three articles of the 1874 Constitution.
2009]
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pronounces specific rights and powers reserved to and for the people.5' First
among these rights is the right of the people to "alter, reform or abolish the
[government] in such manner as they may think proper., 57  Thus, the
framers made the very existence of the state government directly subject to
the power of the people. Moreover, the state government was instituted
explicitly to protect the rights of the people and was empowered only with
such powers as the people allowed.58
Article II also provides an important restriction on government.
Similar to the Tenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, section 29
provides that all of the rights and powers established with the people,
including unenumerated rights, are "excepted out of the general powers of
the government and shall forever remain inviolate., 59 Courts have held that
this provision requires that the people must ratify any act affecting the
constitution, ensuring that the power to modify the constitution is
exclusively vested with the people. 60 For example, in Pryor v. Lowe, the
Arkansas Supreme Court invalidated a statute limiting the scope of
constitutional conventions because the statute was not ratified by the
people.61 The court stated that "any limitation upon the exercise of the
power by the General Assembly, without a ratification thereof by the
electorate, is prohibited by [article II, section 29]" specifically because
constitutional conventions derive their power from the people, and that
power is excepted under section 29 from the power of the government to
modify or restrict.62 Conversely, in Priest v. Polk, the Arkansas Supreme
Court sustained a legislative act's call for a convention precisely because the
act provided that the people must ratify the call for the convention by vote.63
56. ARK. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-29. Section 29 ensures that the specificity of the rights
mentioned in article II should not be construed to be an exhaustive list of the powers reserved
by the people, but rather a list of those rights that the framers thought best to express
explicitly. See id. § 29.
57. Id.§l.
58. Id. § 2. Article II goes on to enumerate specific other rights of the people in a wide
variety of areas. These areas include racial equality, the right to bear arms, free press, trial by
jury, punishments, speedy and public trials, habeas corpus, searches of citizens,
imprisonment, privileges and immunities, antitrust protections, property ownership and
takings, taxation, eminent domain, religion and religious free exercise, and slavery
prohibitions. Id. §§ 1-28.
59. Id. § 29; see infra text accompanying notes 60-63 (describing the reservation of
certain enumerated rights to the people).
60. See, e.g., Priest v. Polk, 322 Ark. 673, 686, 912 S.W.2d 902, 909 (1995) (observing
that the people alone have the "right to reform their constitution and the people have not
given that right to any branch of government").
61. 258 Ark. 188, 192, 523 S.W.2d 199, 202 (1975).
62. Id.
63. Polk, 322 Ark. at 686, 912 S.W.2d at 909.
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The original 1874 Constitution also provided extensive and explicit
limitations and instructions for the bare operation of a limited state
government in other areas.64 Under all of these instructions and restrictions,
the 1874 Constitution focused on providing the government with only the
minimum power necessary to function, with all remaining power vested
with the people.
What power that the constitution did bestow on the government was
severely limited. Professors Blair and Barth summarized the oppressive
nature of the 1874 Constitution like this:
[The] pervasive distrust of government is expressed in almost
every section of the 1874 [Constitution]. To ensure popular
control over officialdom, many offices that were previously
appointive became elective, and terms were almost uniformly
reduced from four to two years. This gave voters ... forty-four
rather than fourteen opportunities to exercise their electoral
control in any four-year period. To prevent excessive and unwise
law making, the legislature was limited to one sixty-day session
every other year. Maximum salaries for all state and county
officials were specified and fixed. Elaborate statutory detail was
included on everything from the conduct of elections to the times
and places of circuit court meetings and the procedures for letting
state printing contracts so any state official tempted to abuse his
powers had little leeway.... Above all, the taxing and spending
powers were circumscribed with every prohibitive device
imaginable. Sixty-nine of the 261 sections of the unamended
64. Articles IV through VII impose dozens of detailed limitations on the powers of each
department of the state government. The other articles provide additional rules, limitations,
and protections that further circumscribe both the express powers of the state government and
any latitude that the state government may assert in carrying out what powers it does have.
For example, article III established the original rules protecting the franchise and elections;
article VIII describes the original apportionment scheme; article IX protects certain property
from court-ordered seizure and provides the property rights of women; article X requires the
legislature to pass laws to aid agriculture, mining, and manufacturing; article XIII prevents
redefinition of counties without the consent of a majority of voters in the parts of the counties
affected; article XV makes free public education a state function; article XV provides a
broad power of impeachment against all State officers and judges; and article XVI imposes
extensive limits on government credit, debts, finances, salaries, and powers of taxation.
article XIX further provides a veritable cornucopia of limitations ranging from a prohibition
on duels for state officeholders, residence requirements for civil office holders, and penalties
for office holders for failing to perform their duties, to requirements regarding "stationery,




1874 constitution dealt with financial matters, and most in a
restrictive way: local governments were severely limited in their
taxing powers, state tax and appropriations measures required
extraordinary majorities, and there could be no extension of credit
or assumption of debt for any purposes whatsoever.
65
With such tight controls constitutionally prescribed, future variations,
government power expansions (or contractions), and many social and
economic services now considered essential would only be possible if the
constitution were changed by amendment or complete revision.66 As a
result, the power to amend the constitution became and remains a key tool
for the people of Arkansas to get what they need out of government.
b. The power of constitutional change
The second key feature of the 1874 Constitution relevant to popular
constitutional activism is the power to change the constitution itself.
Currently, there are only two constitutionally-prescribed methods to amend
the constitution: legislative proposals and popular initiatives.67 The 1874
Constitution, however, originally reserved exclusively to the legislature the
power to amend the constitution through proposals that were drafted by the
legislature and then submitted to the people for approval. Article XIX,
section 22 of the 1874 Constitution provides that:
Either branch of the General Assembly, at a regular session
thereof, may propose amendments to this Constitution; and if the
same be agreed to by a majority of all members elected to each
house, such proposed amendments... shall be submitted to the
electors of the State, for approval or rejection; and if a majority of
the electors voting at such election adopt such amendments, the
same shall become a part of this Constitution .... 68
Under this provision, the legislature is empowered to propose up to
three individual amendments to the constitution at a time.69 In all cases, the
1874 Constitution requires that the people must approve any and all changes
made to the constitution.7 °  This method of submitting proposed
constitutional amendments to the people remains to this day.
65. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 137.
66. Id. at 138.
67. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1, amended by ARK. CONST. amend. XII; id art. XIX, § 22.





In 1910, the people of Arkansas created a second method of
constitutional change by adopting the 1910 Initiative and Referendum
Amendment. 7' This amendment provided that "the people... reserve to
themselves [the] power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution
and to enact or reject the same at polls as independent of the legislative
assembly, and also reserve [the] power at their own option to approve or
reject at the polls any act of the legislative assembly.,7 2  Under this
reservation, the people of Arkansas reserved to themselves the sovereign
power to propose constitutional amendments.73
Ten years later, the people adopted a new initiative and referendum
amendment that superseded the 1910 Initiative and Referendum
Amendment.74  This amendment, the 1920 Initiative and Referendum
Amendment, has been seen as a reaction to the interpretation imposed on the
1910 version by the Arkansas Supreme Court that found that although the
people of Arkansas as a sovereign whole had the power to initiate
constitutional amendments and local legislation, local populations were not
empowered to initiate local legislation.75 The 1920 revision addressed this
71. Brickhouse v. Hill, 167 Ark. 513, 516, 268 S.W. 865, 866 (1925); Hodges v. Dawdy,
104 Ark. 583, 587, 149 S.W. 656, 657 (1912). This amendment was originally numbered as
Amendment 13 to the 1874 Constitution but was subsequently renumbered amendment 7.
Cobb v. Burress, 213 Ark. 177, 181, 209 S.W.2d 694, 697 (1948).
72. Hodges, 104 Ark. at 587, 149 S.W. at 657 (quoting ARK. CONST. amend. XIII of
1910).
73. Id. at 593, 149 S.W. at 660. Hodges v. Dawdy was the first interpretation of the
1910 Initiative and Referendum Amendment. In Hodges, the Arkansas Supreme Court
interpreted the amendment literally as a reservation of part of the legislative power previously
conferred by the people to the General Assembly. Id. at 593-95, 149 S.W. at 660-61.
74. Cobb, 213 Ark. at 185, 209 S.W.2d at 698-99. The 1920 Initiative and Referendum
Amendment received 86,360 votes for and 43,662 votes against. Brickhouse, 167 Ark. at
530, 268 S.W. at 871 (Arnold, J., concurring). The Amendment was declared lost by the
Speaker of the House on January 15, 1921 (for want of the required majority of votes cast in
the election), but it was held adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Brickhouse. Id. at
524, 268 S.W. at 869 (majority opinion). This amendment subsequently became known as
Amendment 7. Cobb, 213 Ark. at 181, 209 S.W.2d at 697. All references in this article from
this point on will refer to the 1920 amendment as the 1920 Initiative and Referendum
Amendment, Amendment 7, or ARK. CONST. amend. VII.
75. See, e.g., Beene v. Hutto, 194 Ark. 107, 111-12, 105 S.W.2d 530, 531 (1937)
(Mehaffy, J., dissenting); see infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text (describing the
popular reaction to the Arkansas Supreme Court's interpretation of the 1910 Initiative and
Referendum Amendment). Despite language in the amendment, omitted above, that
suggested that the "people of each municipality [and] each county" had the power to "initiate
and enact local legislation," the court in Hodges held that "the amendment ... does not
confer power on the voters of a municipality or county, apart from the other people of the
state, to initiate any kind of legislation." Hodges, 104 Ark. at 598, 149 S.W. at 662
(describing the Arkansas Supreme Court's interpretation that the amendment did not allow
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issue directly by specifically reserving initiative and referendum powers to
the people of each municipality and county "as to all local, special and
municipal legislation of every character in and for their respective
municipalities and counties. 76
The 1920 Initiative and Referendum Amendment also revised and
significantly expanded on the power of the people to initiate constitutional
amendments to make it a broader power of amendment than the power
allowed to the legislature.77 First, the revised initiative power allows an
unlimited number of amendments to be proposed in each qualifying
election.78
Second, the framers of the 1920 Initiative and Referendum Amendment
protected the amendments passed by the people from reversal by the
executive or the legislature by prohibiting the Governor from using the veto
power against "measures initiated by or referred to the people, 79 and
requiring a two-thirds supermajority vote in the General Assembly to repeal
or amend initiative-based amendments.8 °
Third, the people need only approve a constitutional amendment by a
majority of votes cast on the measure.8' This corrected a deficiency in the
1910 Initiative and Referendum Amendment's method of amending the
constitution under which it was uncertain what type of majority was
required to pass a constitutional amendment.82 The 1920 Initiative and
local populations to initiate and enact local legislation).
76. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1, cl. 6, amended by ARK. CONST. amend. VII; see also Cobb,
213 Ark. at 185, 209 S.W.2d at 698-99.
77. See ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1, cl. 6, amended by ARK. CONST. amend.VII; see also
Brickhouse, 167 Ark. at 529-30, 268 S.W. at 870 (Arnold, J., concurring) (finding that the
amendment's "comprehensive and enlarged provisions[] so regulated the initiative and
referendum principle as to remove the doubts which had arisen in judicial construction [of the
1910 Initiative and Referendum Amendment]").
78. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1, amended by ARK. CONST. amend.VII. By contrast, the
General Assembly can only propose three amendments for each qualifying election. ARK.
CONST. art. XIX, § 22.
79. Id. ("The veto power of the Governor... shall not extend to measures initiated by or
referred to the people."). Thus, as the term "measures" is defined by the amendment to
include "any bill, law, resolution, ordinance, charter, constitutional amendment or legislative
proposal or enactment of any character," this prohibition protects any and all measures
approved by the people from being subject to the veto power that the Governor would hold
over similar measures originating from the General Assembly. Id. (emphasis added); id. art.
VI, § 15.
80. See id. Moreover, as a constitutional amendment, once an initiated amendment is
adopted by the people, it can only be modified or repealed by future constitutional
amendments. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Goss, supra note 15, at 15-16. This confusion contributed to the invalidation of
a number of constitutional amendments passed prior to the 1920 Initiative and Referendum




Referendum Amendment therefore specifically disclaimed any requirement
that initiative amendments receive a majority of the electors voting in the
election in which the constitutional amendment is offered.83
In addition, the 1920 Initiative and Referendum Amendment can itself
be seen as an example of popular constitutional activism at work: a popular
reaction against a constitutional interpretation by the Arkansas Supreme
Court. This is because the 1920 Initiative and Referendum Amendment
came about as a popular reaction against the ruling of the Arkansas Supreme
Court in Hodges v. Dawdy84 that disallowed local populations from
initiating local legislation. As the court in Dozier v. Ragsdale85 noted, the
court in Hodges held the initiation of local legislation provision provided in
the 1910 Initiative and Referendum Amendment was "meaningless" despite
what appeared to be clear language to the contrary in the amendment itself.
86
"No one doubted at the time, and no one doubts now, that the people, in
adopting this amendment, thought they were providing for local legislation
in counties by initiating acts. 87 Yet the court in Hodges still found that
such initiation of local legislation was not guaranteed by the 1910
Amendment.88
In response to this decision, the people adopted the 1920 Initiative and
Referendum Amendment to revise and make explicit the power local
populations have to enact local legislation.89 As the court in Tindall v.
Searan subsequently observed, "[t]he fact that the people adopted this
provision a second time, and having written it in such plain language that it
cannot be misunderstood by anyone, shows clearly that the people intended
to reserve to themselves the right to pass all local laws affecting the
counties.' 9°
The Arkansas Supreme Court has also recognized that the broad power
inherent in the people's reservation of the legislative power does not permit
technical flaws or defects to thwart the intended meaning of constitutional
amendments initiated and passed by the people.91 The court in Reeves v.
Smith stated the principle in this way:
83. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1, amended by ARK. CONST. amend. VII.
84. 104 Ark. 583, 598, 149 S.W. 656, 662 (1912).
85. 186 Ark. 654, 656, 55 S.W.2d 779, 780 (1932).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Hodges, 104 Ark. at 598, 149 S.W. at 662.
89. Goss, supra note 15, at 15.
90. 192 Ark. 173, 177, 90 S.W.2d 476, 478 (1936).
91. See Reeves v. Smith, 190 Ark. 213, 216, 78 S.W.2d 72, 73 (1935); Tindall, 192 Ark.
at 179, 90 S.W.2d at 479. But see infra Part IV.C (noting the court's increasing involvement
in evaluating the ballot sufficiency of initiative-based amendment proposals).
2009]
UALR LAW REVIEW
[The 1920 Initiative and Referendum Amendment] permits the
exercise of the power reserved to the people to control, to some
extent at least, the policies of the [S]tate, but more particularly of
counties and municipalities, as distinguished from the exercise of
similar power by the Legislature, and since that residuum of
power remains in the electors, their acts should not be thwarted by
strict or technical construction.,
92
Moreover, the framers appear to have specifically envisioned the
gradual amendment process to be the manner in which the core document
was to change after 1874. This is because neither the 1874 Constitution nor
any subsequent amendment, however, provided a method for wholesale
constitutional change through convention or any other process; in other
words, there is no expressly permitted method for obtaining an entirely new
or drastically revised constitution.93 The court in Harvey v. Ridgeway
observed that this absence was intentional.94 After experiencing five
constitutional conventions in the forty years leading up to the 1874
document, the framers were certainly familiar with the convention process
and could have built such a process explicitly into their constitutional
framework.95 It is clear that the framers elected not to do so.
Importantly, however, the power to adopt a completely new
constitution through a constitutional convention has been found to belong to
the people regardless of the power's absence from the 1874 Constitution.96
This power has been held to flow from the people's article II, section 1
power to "alter, reform or abolish the [government] in such manner as they
may think proper.,
97
92. Reeves, 190 Ark. at 215-216, 78 S.W.2d at 73.
93. See Harvey v. Ridgeway, 248 Ark. 35, 46, 450 S.W.2d 281,287 (1970).
94. See id. at 46, 450 S.W.2d at 287 (finding that the court "may reasonably assume that
the people intended it that way").
95. It is also possible that the framers simply did not feel the need to build a framework
for constitutional conventions into the 1874 Constitution because they knew that power
already existed inherently in the people and therefore did not need to be explicitly reserved in
the text of the constitution. On the other hand, the level of detail and explicit protections and
reservations of power that were included in the 1874 Constitution seem to suggest that this is
not the case, or at least that the primary method of constitutional change should be by the
gradual amendment process.
96. This is because constitutional conventions derive their power from the people and
the people have the power to adopt a new constitution by whatever means they see fit. Supra
note 57 and accompanying text; see Harvey, 248 Ark. at 45-48, 450 S.W.2d at 287-88. Thus
by extension, the General Assembly has the power to ask the people to authorize a
convention to adopt a new constitution. Cf, e.g., id.; Id. at 49, 450 S.W.2d at 289 (Wootton,
J., dissenting) (citing Webb v. State, 176 Ark. 722, 3 S.W.2d 1000 (1928) and 16 AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 30 for the proposition that the General Assembly could call a
convention because it was not denied the power).
97. Harvey, 248 Ark. at 46-47, 450 S.W.2d at 287 (quoting ARK. CONST. art. II, § 1)
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That said, the people have not approved of any such wholesale changes
to the Constitution since 1874 despite numerous attempts by the Governor
and General Assembly over the years to do so.98 Interestingly, many of the
changes proposed by these sweeping reform efforts have been adopted by
way of individual amendments, legislative action, and administrative action,
as well as a host of additional reform amendments.99 As a result of the
people's unwillingness to approve the changes offered by the conventions
that have been called over the years, and despite the tremendous potential
for popular constitutional activism through wholesale constitutional change,
constitutional conventions have not played a direct role in the development
of constitutional law in Arkansas. 00 Instead, constitutional amendments
have been used extensively since 1874 to develop constitutional law. This
suggests that the framers' preferred method of piecemeal change by
amendment announced in the 1874 Constitution and in the Initiative and
Referendum Amendments continues to be dominant today.' 0 Indeed, it has
(emphasis added); see also Pryor v. Lowe, 258 Ark. 188, 192, 523 S.W.2d 199, 202 (1975).
98. See infra Part II.B (listing attempts to change the 1874 Constitution by convention).
99. See, e.g., BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 152 (noting that in the period between
1974 and 2000, of the twenty-seven major changes proposed by the 1968 Constitutional
Revision Study Commission, fourteen have been adopted by individual amendment or
legislative or administrative action); see also infra Part II.B (noting the absence of any
successful attempts at wholesale constitution revision through constitutional conventions
since 1874).
100. I do not mean to suggest that the constitutional conventions that have been called
since 1874 have not played an important role in the politics of constitutional law. Indeed,
these conventions demonstrate convincingly that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the
1874 Constitution. As yet, however, a single magical bullet has not been found to marry this
dissatisfaction with actual wholesale change. My point here is only that because these
constitutional conventions have not successfully replaced the 1874 Constitution, they have
not been the effective instruments of popular constitutional activism that constitutional
amendments have been.
101. Certainly other possible explanations exist for the dearth of successful wholesale
revisions to the 1874 Constitution. For example, to the extent that amendments proposed by
both initiative and legislative groups are driven by political forces, a failure of those forces,
however strong, to create or capitalize on a positive political environment would in turn
create a failure in any wholesale revision attempt. This is because voter turnout, positive
media exposure (particularly in the era of widespread television, radio, and Internet
coverage), and a host of other factors impact whether a proposed wholesale revision would
achieve enough popular support at the polls to succeed, regardless of whether a majority of
people in the state as a whole wanted wholesale constitutional change. Moreover, as
Professors Blair and Barth have pointed out, citizen indifference to such attempts has always
been a problem to constitutional revision efforts. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 145. All
of these issues must be overcome to achieve successful broad constitutional reform. That
said, the end result continues to be constitutional revision through the only method explicitly
provided for in the Arkansas Constitution: piecemeal constitutional amendment, a process
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been exclusively amendment-based forces that have expanded the limits
imposed by the 1874 Constitution. Consequently, I focus the remainder of
this article on the important role that constitutional amendments, particularly
initiative-based constitutional amendments, have played and how they
represent the best measure of popular constitutional activism in Arkansas
today.
B. The Primacy of Initiative-Based Constitutional Amendments as
Instruments of Popular Constitutional Activism
The fourth key characteristic of Arkansas's constitutional tradition is
the frequent use of initiative-based constitutional amendments by the
citizens of Arkansas to control their constitution. Indeed, Arkansas's long
history of frequently amending the 1874 Constitution l is evidence that
constitutional amendments have been a powerful force in Arkansas's
constitutional law. This use is significant when compared to the other
methods of constitutional change because it shows that, instead of relying on
the legislature'0 3 or broad constitutional reforms 10 4 to keep the constitution
in line with the people's changing social and administrative needs, the
people have instead used initiative-based amendments. 10 5 As will be
over which the people have the final say.
102. See, e.g., Goss, supra note 15, at 9, 15-22 (detailing all 169 amendments submitted
to the people from 1874 to 1992); infra Parts II.B.1-4; infra app.1. Indeed, the people's
wheels of revision began to change within a decade of the passage of the 1874 Constitution.
Since that time, more than 190 amendments have been proposed and submitted to the people
for consideration, resulting in the adoption of eighty-three amendments through 2006. Goss,
supra note 15, at 9, 15-22; see also Arkansas Secretary of State, Election Results,
http://www.arelections.org/index.php?l=l html (last visited June 27, 2009); Arkansas
Secretary of State, Initiatives and Amendments from 1938-2006,
http://www.sosweb.state.ar.us/elections/electionsjpdfs/initiatives-amendments_1938-
2006.pdf; infra fig. 1.
103. See infra Part II.B.1-4. Moreover, the people have used initiative-based
amendments nearly as frequently as the legislature has used their power to propose
amendments. See infra Part II.B. 1-4.
104. See Goss, supra note 15, at 9; infra Part II.B.1-4. Since 1874, three additional
constitutional conventions have been held to reform the state constitution. Goss, supra note
15, at 10-14. Each of the proposed constitutions resulting from these conventions, however,
was soundly defeated when presented to the voters. Id.
105. See infra Part II.B.1-4. It is clear, however, that the people as a body are not solely
responsible for the creation of initiative-based amendments. It is perhaps more correct to
view the people themselves as instruments of constitutional change that are manipulated by
powerful political interests precisely because the people are the source of all political power
and the only body ultimately empowered to change the constitution. Yet the fickle will of the
people in approving or rejecting constitutional changes proposed by these other interests
suggests that the people are not completely under the control of political entities. See BLAIR
& BARTH, supra note 8, at 141-42 (noting the lack of any persistent pattern in the people's
voting habits on constitutional changes). One study of "public opinion" on constitutional
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discussed in Part III below, the people have also been seemingly unwilling,
until possibly very recently, to rely on the courts to control the direction of
constitutional law. 10 6  Consequently, initiative-based constitutional
amendments have historically represented essential instruments of
constitutional change in Arkansas. 10 7  The incidence with which these
amendments reach the people for a vote in a given year, therefore,
represents the best measure of the level of popular constitutional activism.
change summarized by Professors Blair and Barth suggested that "voters do seem to pick and
choose quite deliberately among ballot issues but that 'voting patterns provide only hazy
evidence of their choices."' Id. at 141 (quoting WALTER NUNN, VOTING BEHAVIOR ON
STATEWIDE BALLOT ISSUES: 1964-1976, at 36-37 (1976)). Thus, even if the people are
influenced by political interests, the people have themselves remained powerful forces of
constitutional change, with initiative-based constitutional amendments as their most potent
instrument.
106. See infra Part IV (describing the reemergence of constitutional law phenomenon in
Arkansas and the Arkansas Supreme Court's increasing use of the Arkansas Constitution).
107. Much of what has been discussed in this article, including the initiative power of the
people to advance constitutional amendments and the power of the people alone to approve
all amendments, can be said of numerous other states. For example, states including Arizona,
Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Oregon employ similarly "easy-access"
constitutional amendment processes. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 418 n.6. What makes
Arkansas unique is the frequency and manner in which the people have used these tools to
control and develop constitutional law in their state.
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Figure 1: Constitutional Amendments Proposed from 1874 to 2006
A simple analysis of the entire period (1912 to 2006) during which
initiative-based amendments have been available to the people, however,
would not be an appropriate measure of popular constitutional activism
because social, political, and legal changes within that period create
countervailing forces that likely obfuscate meaningful interpretations of the
amendment activity occurring amidst those forces. Consequently, care must
be taken to account for these forces analytically and statistically.
I have, therefore, opted to use the following methodology to quantify
the impact of initiative-based amendments in Arkansas: (1) distinguish
between legislatively-proposed amendments and initiative-based
amendments, and (2) break up the 1912 to 2006 period into smaller periods
that correspond with major social, political, and legal changes occurring in
the state and across the country. 0 8 Figure 2 reflects the first distinction:
108. Although an amendment-by-amendment breakdown of each constitutional
amendment proposed since 1874 would certainly be fascinating, such a review is not
appropriate here. First, evaluating each amendment would be beyond the scope of this article
because the focus of this article is on describing objectively the process of popular
constitutional activism, not necessarily its content. Where content would be informative of
the process, however, I will attempt to explain how the content of activism relates the will of
the people to the constitutional process. Second, evaluating each amendment would present
several analytical flaws. Perhaps foremost among these would be that such an analysis would
suggest that I am arguing that every constitutional amendment adopted or proposed since
1874 fits the paradigm of popular constitutional activism that I offer in this article. Although







C'0 '0 00 0' C4 00 0 D 4 00 0r 0 eq 00 0 cY 'D
r - 00 00 Ok0 0 -- 1 Cq en m 4 W)l %0r- t 00 00 0. 00<
Year
[ Vol. 32
2009] POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM
Figure 2: Amendments Proposed by Initiative: 1912 to 2006
A macroscopic review of this chart and Figure 1 reveals four
apparently distinct periods of initiative-based amendment activity: 1874-
1908, 1910-1928, 1930-1966, and 1968-2006. The first period describes a
period where amendments were submitted to the people only by the
legislature. The next two periods correspond to peaks in amendment
I do believe that the trend of amendments and the amendment process itself constitute
powerful instruments for popular constitutional activism, to suggest that they are all
exemplars of such a model would ignore a variety of other factors that drive constitutional
reform; consequently, I do not make such a claim here. For example, as other scholars have
observed, constitutional amendments by initiative have been instigated by political forces and
many of the initiatives adopted received plenary gubernatorial support. E.g., BLAIR &
BARTH, supra note 8, at 141, 153. Although such forces are certainly at work, this article
focuses on the power entrusted solely to the people to approve or reject all amendments, even
politically-driven amendments supported by the Governor or the legislature, and the people's
authority to initiate amendments on their own.
In addition, a number of attempts have already been made to find patterns in the
amendment process or of underlying meanings in its results. See, e.g., id. at 141-42. As yet,
such analyses have been unable to discern a pattern in the amendments approved over the
amendments rejected. Id. Here, I suggest only one broad truth: amendments indicate a
willingness of the people to directly, and frequently, change the constitutional landscape of
Arkansas to suit their collective will.
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activity during the period from 1874 to 1966 after the initiative power was
introduced in 1910 (and then again in 1920). The last period, and the period
focused on in this article, is the period corresponding to the ascendancy of
the Arkansas Supreme Court and the reemergence of state constitutional law
on a national level, a number of movements towards wholesale
constitutional reform, and a marked shift in the number of popular initiatives
proposed.
These distinct periods serve as the framework from which I will
examine the social, political, and legal movements that have occurred since
1912 and compare the impact of those movements to the incidence of
initiative-based amendments proposed in each election year. As I will
explain in the following four subsections, these distinct periods also confirm
that a statistical analysis of the 1912 to 2006 period as a whole would not
likely produce meaningful conclusions given the radical social and political
changes that developed in the state contemporaneously with the shifts. I
will also take steps both to isolate the impact of these changes for later
statistical analysis and to evaluate the state of constitutional change in each
period, with an eye toward coming to a conclusion about the future of
constitutional revisionism under the initiative power.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that although there
are substantial peaks and valleys in the numbers of amendments proposed
and approved, the first significant characteristic of the distinction between
initiative-based and legislature-based amendments is the level of
participation in the amendment process that the people have maintained over
the years. Whether offering one amendment or as many as seven, the people
have offered amendments in more than 72% of elections from 1912 to
2006.109
1. 1874-1908: Amendments Submitted to the People
It did not take long for the first signs of Arkansas's tradition of
constitutional revision to develop after the formal ratification of the 1874
Constitution, with the first proposed constitutional amendment offered to the
people by the Legislature in 1880.110 During this period, the people were
called upon to approve or reject constitutional amendments offered by the
General Assembly in 55% of qualifying elections. As indicated by the
linear trend line in Figure 3, the legislature's amendment proposals were
used with increasing frequency leading up to the 1910 election.
109. The year 1912 was the first year in which the people could initiate constitutional
amendments directly because amendments may only be offered in the state's biennial general
elections and the first initiative and referendum amendment was passed in 1910. Goss, supra




Figure 3: Amendments Proposed: 1874 to 1908
2. 1910-1928: A People Empowered
The first major amendment with respect to popular constitutional
activism came relatively soon after the initial passage of the 1874
Constitution-the 1910 Initiative and Referendum Amendment.'1 ' In
introducing the initiative power, this amendment ushered in a new era of
direct participation by the people in the constitutional process whereby the
people could place constitutional amendments directly on the ballot without
prior approval of the legislature." 12 With this newfound power, the people
initiated proposed amendments to the constitution in nearly 89% of possible
elections from 1910 to 1928, averaging nearly 1.5 proposed amendments at
each biennial election opportunity. This represents close to a 24% increase
in proposed constitutional amendments from the previous period, 1874 to
111. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
112. See supra Part II.A.2.b.









\O~~~~ 00 -T el 0 0 0 (1 D 00 0C, c W0 0




1908, when the legislature alone submitted proposed amendments to
the people.
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Figure 4: Amendments Proposed: 1910 to 1928
Also occurring during this period of relative initiative inactivity was an
ultimately unsuccessful movement to effect wholesale constitutional change.
In 1918, Governor Charles Brough sponsored a new constitution that
included twenty-four significant differences from the 1874 Constitution.
11 3
Despite the support of the Governor, the proposed constitution was
"resoundingly defeated by Arkansas voters."' 1 4 Professors Barth and Blair,
however, have noted that such broad movements seem to prompt periods of
constitutional updates to implement the very changes that the defeated
constitution sought to accomplish in the first place'-an effect seen in the
next period.
113. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 152.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 152-54. The statistical effect that constitutional conventions have on the level
of popular constitutional activism through initiated amendments is explored more fully below




3. 1930-1964: The Golden Age of Initiative-based Amendments
The period from 1930 to 1964 represents the busiest period in
Arkansas's constitutional history, with eighty-five amendments proposed
over the course of thirty-six years, and more than 2.5 amendments proposed
on average per year. In each of the available years, voters considered at
least two constitutional amendments, either proposed by the legislature or by
the people through the initiative power. This represents an 11% increase in
year-by-year constitutional activity from the prior period (1910-1928), and
a 45% increase in year-by-year constitutional activity from the period
immediately after the ratification of the 1874 Constitution (1874-1908).
Figure 5: Amendments Proposed: 1930 to 1964










For example, in 1930 the people proposed seven amendments to the
constitution on a wide range of issues including elective highway
commissions, taxes, challenges to laws by citizens, elections for referenda
and vacancies, and judicial compensation.' 16 This flurry proposed more
amendments in one election than in all of the prior twelve years combined.
Although all of these proposals failed, this level of activity turned out to be a
harbinger of the level of participation exercised by the people over the next
three decades.
Figure 6: Amendments Proposed by Initiative: 1930 to 1964
The next surge in amendments by initiative came in 1938, when six
amendments were proposed by initiative (and three proposed by the
legislature). These initiatives included proposals for workers compensation,
education, highway bond refunding, tax exemptions for new industries, as
well as regulations for the practice of law and the method by which
vacancies in statewide offices were to be filled." 7 Not surprisingly, the
116. Goss, supra note 15, at 17. The legislature also introduced a proposed amendment
that established state schools. Id.
117. Id. at 17-18. Interestingly, the legislature was also active during this period,











character of popular initiative proposals during this period tracked with the
broader national themes of social welfare and government reform that swept
the nation in the New Deal era of the 1930s.
The last major surge of proposed amendments during this period
occurred in 1956. In total, nine constitutional amendments were proposed,
seven through the initiative process and two by the legislature. 118 Perhaps
most notable among the amendments initiated through the people, and
certainly the most pertinent insight into the feelings of the people on the
constitutional process at the time, was amendment 44.119 This amendment
challenged the supremacy of the federal judiciary as the ultimate arbiter of
the Federal Constitution by specifically rejecting the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
120
This amendment also reflects Arkansas's tradition of popular
constitutional activism perhaps more clearly than any other amendment.
First, it indicates a willingness on the part of the people to see their own
constitutional traditions as distinctly separate from that of the larger,
national constitutional framework. Second, it shows the willingness of the
people to use their state's own constitution to provide the level of protection
desired by the majority of the voting population.
offering its maximum number of possible proposals allowed under the 1874 Constitution. Id.
at 17. The only proposed amendment of these that was not adopted was an amendment that
would have eliminated the poll tax, a key achievement that would, once adopted, increase
access to Arkansas's tradition of constitutional activism to a broader cross-section of citizens.
See id.; infra note 127 and accompanying text.
118. Goss, supra note 15, at 19.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 169; see ARK. CONST. amend. XLIV, § 1. Section 1 of the amendment read:
[T]he General Assembly of the State of Arkansas shall take appropriate action and
pass laws opposing in every Constitutional manner the Un-Constitutional
desegregation decisions of May 17, 1954 and May 31, 1955 of the United States
Supreme Court, including interposing the sovereignty of the State of Arkansas to
the end of nullification of these and all deliberate, palpable and dangerous
invasions of or encroachments upon rights and powers not delegated to the United
States nor prohibited to the States by the Constitution of the United States and
Amendments thereto, and those rights and powers reserved to the States and to the
People thereof by any department of [the Federal Government]. Said opposition
shall continue steadfast until such time as such Un-Constitutional invasions or
encroachments shall have abated or shall have been rectified, or the same shall be
transformed into an Amendment to the Constitution ....
ARK. CONST. amend. XLIV, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. LXIX (referencing Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). Sections 2 through 4 of the amendment empowered the
state to enforce the amendment. Id. § 2-4. The amendment was devised by members of the
Arkansas legislature in response to the Little Rock High School crisis in 1957 that resulted in
the desegregation of Little Rock High School by federal forces. Goss, supra note 15, at 170.
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Moreover, this amendment did more than regulate the salary of state
officials or create allowances for the government to tax or incur debt as
many other amendments have. Instead, it articulated a vision that the people
were willing to establish by popular vote the place of Arkansas in the
federalism of the day and reaffirm the centrality of their constitution in their
lives. While amendment 44 is certainly unconstitutional under the Federal
Constitution in many respects, 121 and in fact has been repealed by
subsequent amendment, 22 it provides an important lens with which to view
the state of popular constitutional activism in the 1950s and the people's
perspective on the constitutional process. This perspective arguably
continues to this day in the form of amendment initiatives that seek to
provide or secure rights that are likely unavailable through the existing state
constitution or under the Federal Constitution, as well as amendment
initiatives that circumscribe rights that are within the province of state
control-such as marriage. 1
23
The extremely high number of initiated amendments proposed during
this period, however, was not uniform across the entire period. First,
initiatives appeared in only approximately 78% percent of possible
elections. Although this percentage is certainly not low, and is in fact
slightly higher than the percentage offered since the initiative power was
introduced in 1910, the underlying data indicate a subtle shift in the quantity
and quality of constitutional activism in the state. Second, this shift seems
centered around the 1956 surge of amendments, and is isolated by a period
of four years of initiative inactivity before and after the surge.
4. 1966-2006: The Evolution of Popular Constitutional Activism
After more than three decades of unprecedented popular involvement
in the constitutional process, both in adjusting the Arkansas Constitution to
reflect the values of the people and in slowly fixing systemic problems
inhering from the restrictions imposed by the original 1874 Constitution and
its subsequent amendments, another distinct shift occurred in the total
number of amendments proposed. As Figure 7 illustrates, beginning in
1966, no amendments were offered in 1966, 1970, or 1972, either by
initiative or proposal of the legislature.
121. See, e.g., Dietz v. Arkansas, 709 F. Supp. 902, 905 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
122. ARK. CONST. amend. LXIX.
123. For example, with the adoption of amendment 83 to the Arkansas Constitution,
voters established by popular initiative that marriage consisted only of unions between "one
man and one woman." Id. amend. LXXXIII, § 1.
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Figure 7: Amendments Proposed: 1966 to 2006
Although such an absence is not unprecedented, 24 this shift occurred
contemporaneously with an even more pronounced change in amendments
proposed by popular initiative. Figure 8 shows that between 1966 and
1982, only two amendments were proposed by initiative. During this
sixteen-year period, initiated amendments were offered during only 22%
percent of possible elections, one of the lowest levels of popular
involvement through initiated amendments over a sixteen or more year
period since 1912 when the initiative power was first used. Moreover, the
average number of amendments proposed by initiative during the 1966 to
1982 period plummeted to 0.22, the lowest average number of amendments
proposed during any sixteen-year period in Arkansas's history.
124. A similar absence occurred around the time of the 1956 surge of proposed
amendments. See supra fig. 6.
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Figure 8: Amendments Proposed by Initiative: 1966 to 2006
This statistical shift, however, did not occur within a vacuum; rather, it
coincided with a transformation in traditional Arkansas politics.125 As
Professors Blair and Barth have observed, from the 1960s forward Arkansas
has experienced a broad "popularization of politics. 1 26 "Arkansas voters,"
they observe, "have become much more participatory, now generally
matching national levels of voter turnout" and occasionally exceeding
national turnout. 12  Yet despite this increase in voter turnout, Figure 8
shows that the level of popular constitutional activism by initiative
amendment has changed, disappearing from 1966 to 1982 and then briefly
125. See generally BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 45-57.
126. Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 50. Professors Blair and Barth cite a number of complex and interrelated
reasons for this increase in popular participation at the polls:
[T]he elimination of the poll tax and the white primary; the occasional vigorous
voter registration efforts by candidates, parties, and interested organizations; a
secretary of state's office that, by the 1990s, was enthusiastically encouraging voter
registration with a host of educational outreach activities; the stimulation provided
by spirited close contests replacing predictable outcomes; and, of course, the
enfranchisement of the African American citizenry.
Id. at 50-51.
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reemerging in 1984 before beginning a steady, measured decline leading to
2006 when no amendments were offered. 28 As in the prior period, a review
of the social, political, and legal movements occurring during this period
provides some insight into the changing use of initiative-based amendments.
Importantly, this increase in overall voter participation coincided with
increasing political interest in comprehensive constitutional reform. 29 In
1961, 1963, and 1965, attempts were made to pass legislation that would
have called for a general convention to reconstitute the aging 1874
Constitution. 130 These attempts, however, were opposed and defeated by the
Governor of Arkansas, Orval E. Faubus, "who was at the peak of his
considerable power of his twelve-year tenure (1955-1967)..''
In 1967, however, Governor Faubus was succeeded by Winthrop
Rockefeller, "a strong advocate of constitutional revision. 132 As one of his
first acts, Governor Rockefeller, along with representatives from the
legislature, judiciary, and the Arkansas Bar Association, appointed the
Arkansas Constitutional Revision Study Commission. 33 The Commission
concluded that "a general revision of the 1874 Constitution was needed and
that a constitutional convention was the best way to achieve it.,
134
In 1968, Arkansas voters authorized a constitutional convention and
strongly supported candidates who supported states' rights and reform of the
state constitution. 35  The delegates to Arkansas's seventh constitutional
convention worked from 1969 to 1970 to develop a complete revision to the
1874 Constitution.136 The final product of the Convention was a streamlined
and modernized constitution about a fourth the size of the 1874
Constitution. 131 Surprisingly, despite the previously strong support for
128. Apparently continuing this trend, the 2008 general election proposed only one
initiative-based constitutional amendment. Arkansas Secretary of State, 2008 Ballot Issues,
http://www.votenaturally.org/2008_ballot_08_constamendments.html (last visited Sept. 7,
2009).
129. Goss, supra note 15, at 10-11. This interest was developed under the leadership of
several powerful politicians, including future United States Senator David Pryor (then State
Representative), State Representative Virgil Butler, United States Representative Wilbur D.
Mills, and Ted Boswell. Id.





135. Goss, supra note 15, at 11. The push for the protection of states' rights in Arkansas
was not a new development. It can be expressly seen in amendments as early as Amendment
44 in 1956. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
136. Goss, supra note 15, at 11.
137. Id. Not all of the language removed by the proposed constitution's drastic reduction
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constitutional revision, the voters soundly defeated the proposed constitution
in the general election of 1970.138 But not surprisingly, however, was the
relative absence of amendment proposals during this period. From 1966 to
1970, no amendments were proposed by initiative, and only three were
proposed by the legislature. 1
39
In 1975, David Pryor, a longtime advocate of constitutional revision
and then-Governor Pryor, led a revitalized effort to call another
constitutional convention. 40  Limitations imposed on this convention,
however, would have prohibited the convention from altering certain
constitutional provisions, such as the Declaration of Rights and provisions
related to the judiciary, education, workmen's compensation, and the right
to work.14 1 The Arkansas Supreme Court invalidated the convention before
any work could be done on the grounds that the subject-matter limitation
placed on the scope of the Convention's authority was an unconstitutional
restriction on the right of the people to "alter, reform or abolish [their
government] as they may think proper.'
42
In 1977, still another constitutional convention was authorized by the
people, again by a relatively wide margin (56% in favor), and again with
broad political support including that of Governor Pryor and the General
Assembly. 143 The convention was held from 1979 to 1980, and ultimately
presented a single document that revised the 1874 Constitution in a similar
fashion to that set out by the 1970 Proposed Constitution. 44  Again,
however, the people overwhelming rejected the proposed constitutional
convention, this time by a margin of 62.7% to 37.3%.145
The absence of amendments proposed during this period of intense
efforts of wholesale constitutional revision is not surprising. Anecdotally, it
was to be lost. The delegates proposed that many of the provisions could simply be reenacted
as regular statutes because they simply were not appropriate constitutional provisions. Id.
138. Id. at 11-12. The 1970 Constitution was defeated by a margin of 57.5% to 42.5%, a
remarkable defeat considering the wide political and public support that the proposal had
once enjoyed. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 143.
139. Goss, supra note 15, at 20; supra fig. 8.
140. Goss, supra note 15, at 12.
141. Pryor v. Lowe, 258 Ark. 188, 190, 523 S.W.2d 199, 201 (1975); BLAIR & BARTH,
supra note 8, at 143.
142. Lowe, 258 Ark. at 190, 523 S.W.2d at 201 (citing ARK. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("All
political power is inherent in the people, and government is instituted for their protection,
security and benefit; and they have the right to alter, reform or abolish the same in such
manner as they may think proper.")).
143. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 143-44; Goss, supra note 15, at 13.
144. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 144; Goss, supra note 15, at 13. The Convention
did separate out the issue of choosing appellate court judges from the central document,
requiring that piece to be approved independently from the main thrust of the proposed
constitution. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 144; Goss, supra note 15, at 13.
145. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 144.
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is likely that while these conventions were underway, many, if not all, of the
supporters of constitutional revisions became deeply involved in the larger
goal of completely revising the existing 1874 Constitution. This focus away
from individual amendments-by the very forces who ordinarily presented
initiative proposals on behalf the people-would have naturally left fewer
resources to develop additional "one-off' amendment proposals.
Under this hypothesis then, once these limited resources were released
and became available to promote individual amendments again, the level of
amendments proposed by initiative would increase. 146 And beginning in
1984, it appears as though a measure of resurgence happened. The level of
initiated amendments since 1984, however, has never approached the levels
seen during the "golden age" of popular constitutional activism between
1912 and the authorization of the first modem constitutional conventions in
1968.147 Moreover, across the twenty-six-year cycle from 1980 to 2006, the
use of initiative-based amendments has steadily declined to the point where
only one or two initiative-based amendments are offered in any given
biennial general election during the past decade, if any are offered at all.
Importantly, during this period there were no successfully-convened
constitutional conventions.
14 8
Interestingly, the use of initiative-based amendments that has occurred
from 1984 to 2006 seems to partly track the elections of Governors. Figure
8 illustrates a remarkably distinct, apparently cyclical pattern of
initiative-based activity with peaks occurring only in the first biennial
general election after the installation of a new Governor in office, and
followed by successive years of decreasing use of initiative-based
146. In a related analysis, Professors Blair and Barth have suggested that this period of
amendment activity is in part a result of the wholesale revision activities of the past four
decades. Id. at 152 ("Another period of constitutional updates, prompted in part by wholesale
revisions efforts, seems to be in progress.").
147. Goss, supra note 15, at 15-21.
148. During this period, there was some support for another constitutional convention.
BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 146-47. In 1995, Governor Tucker and a specially-
appointed commission worked with the legislature to draft a core document that would be
sent to a constitutional convention as a starting point for the convention's work on wholesale
revision. Id. at 147. The document proposed would have removed 'archaic, obsolete and
gender- or race specific' language," made sweeping structural changes to government, and
included "updates in synch with public consensus." Id. at 147-48. The scope of this initial
document was restricted from making any changes to "abortion, interest rates, or other hot-
button issues." Id. at 147. The question of whether to call a constitutional convention was
put to the voters in 1995. Id. at 149. With nearly universal opposition, the convention was
rejected by 80% of the votes cast. Id. at 149-50. Amidst a series of complications, legal
challenges, and confusion, voter turnout for this election was incredibly low, with only 13%
of registered voters coming to the polls. Id.
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amendments. 149  Whether there is something behind the connection
suggested by this cycle is difficult to say with any certainty. Nevertheless, it
is without doubt that governors have long played a part in the political
machinations that almost certainly have impacted the use of initiative-based
amendments in the three previous periods discussed in this section. 50 From
this, it is reasonable to conclude that the political capital that governors
often have in the years immediately following his or her election would
impact the number of initiative-based amendments in those years, and that
the number of such amendments would decline as a governor's political
capital erodes over the years.
So what can be said of the state of popular constitutional activism in
Arkansas? The State's constitutional history suggests a turbulent and
unpredictable tradition of constitutional activism shared by the people and
the legislature; but as I demonstrated above, there are patterns. Indeed, the
same history indicates the development of a trend towards constitutional
disengagement by the people and away from the "golden age" of popular
activism that abruptly ended with the attempts at wholesale constitutional
revision in the 1960s.'' Yet in order to bring meaning to this apparent trend
beyond the mere incidence of initiative-based amendments, it is necessary to
149. For example, beginning in 1984, the first biennial general election following Bill
Clinton's return as Governor, popular constitutional activism experienced something of a
reemergence with four initiative-based amendments proposed for consideration by the voters.
Yet this reemergence was short-lived: in each successive biennial election, the number of
initiative-based amendments dropped from three, to two, and then to one in both 1990 and
1992. Then, in 1994, the first biennial general election following the election of Jim Guy
Tucker as Governor, initiative-based amendment use jumped up again to three proposed
amendments. Then again in 1996, the first biennial election to occur after Jim Guy Tucker's
resignation and the installation of Mike Huckabee as Governor in July 1995, two
initiative-based amendments were proposed. Since then, only one initiative-based
amendment has been offered in any given election except for 2002, in which two such
amendments were offered.
150. In addition, there is also likely some connection between the use of initiative-based
amendments and the content of the amendments, particularly in light of the hot-button social
and moral issues that have often taken the center stage nationally during the same period-
and with respect to which, politicians, including governors, often align themselves.
151. This apparent trend is also counter to the trends in other states across the nation. As
Professor G. Alan Tarr observed, "[i]f anything, the pace of amendment appears to have
quickened in recent years," noting that "from 1994 to 2001 the states adopted 689
constitutional amendments." STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE
POLITICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 2 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds.,
2006) [hereinafter POLITICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM]. As discussed below,
Arkansas has seen just the opposite during the period from 1984 and 2006: a marked decline
in the number of constitutional amendments proposed by initiative. Infra Part III.
Interestingly, Arkansas in fact tracks with the national absence of wholesale constitutional
reform. POLITICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra, at 2 (noting a decrease in the




attempt to quantify and then qualify the state of popular constitutional
activism in some meaningful way.
III. QUANTIFYING THE DECLINE OF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL
AcTIVISM1
52
As described above, I have measured popular constitutional activism in
this article by the number of constitutional amendments proposed by
initiative in a given year. Thus, an increase or decrease in the number of
amendments proposed by initiative reflects a corresponding increase or
decrease in the level of popular constitutional activism. The rub in this
seemingly simple syllogism, however, lies in the difficulty in meaningfully
explaining changes in popular constitutional activism over time by isolating
potentially countervailing factors that may be obfuscating the true nature of
the state of popular constitutional activism. The first step in addressing this
difficulty is to quantify the magnitude of change in popular constitutional
activism in a useful way.
I will begin by reviewing the period of popular constitutional activism
from 1912 to 2006. During this period, eighty-two amendments were
proposed by initiative. The linear regression line in Figure 9 below suggests
that, overall, the number of amendments per year proposed by initiative
seems to be gradually decreasing.' 53 Yet, the data in Figure 9 also clearly
152. The data used in the statistical analysis in this section can be found in Appendix 1:
Data infra. As a matter of style, I will not cite to Appendix 1 data specifically as it is being
discussed in the analysis. Statistical computations pursuant to this analysis will usually be
located in footnotes unless particularly salient to the discussion.
153. The regression line here, like all regression lines in this article, was calculated using
the "least squares" method to calculate a straight line that best fits the data. See DAVID S.
MOORE & GEORGE P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 136-38
(2006). The least-squares regression line here is the line that makes the sum of the squares of
the differences in values for the number of amendments proposed by initiative from the
predicted value on the line as small as possible, and is described by the following equation:
Y#fAmendments = -0.0257xyear + 2.3387
See id. Thus, the degree of variance of actual data from the linear line of predictions
described by this regression illustrates the strength of the regression in predicting the number
of amendments proposed by initiative based on the year. See id As described below, this
strength is in turn reflected in the degree of correlation of the data to the regression line. See
infra note 155.
A brief note on the statistical methodology that I employ in this article is also in
order. As Professor Walker observed, uncertainty derived from the mathematical modeling
of a given set of data using particular linear regressions, such as the simple regression used
here to analyze the period from 1912 to 2006, is only one sort of uncertainty encountered
when attempting to describe a sample of a population. Vern R. Walker, Restoring the
Individual Plaintiff to Tort Law by Rejecting "Junk Logic" About Specific Causation, 56
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demonstrates that Arkansas has had a turbulent history in the relative levels
of initiative activity spanning three relatively distinct periods of initiative
activity and featuring wild fluctuations in the number of amendments
proposed by initiative occurring alongside long periods of initiative
inactivity. These instabilities likely distort and obfuscate any trends that
may underlie this period of initiative activity, and do not comport with a
conclusion that the number of amendments proposed per year is necessarily
decreasing on its own.
ALA. L. REv. 381, 417-20 (2004); see infra notes 155-161 and accompanying text
(describing the statistical uncertainties in the regression model used in this article to partially
describe the state of popular constitutional activism). Another type of uncertainty rests with
the choice of the mathematical model used. Walker, supra, at 419. Here, I have opted to use
a regression-based analysis instead of a population-based analysis, even though I appear to
have data on the entire population I am interested in during the entire relevant period.
Regression-based analyses are used to make statistical inferences about a larger population
based on information derived from a sample of that population. Id. at 420. Population-based
analyses, on the other hand, describe the population based on information known about the
entire population. I have opted to use a regression analysis here because I in fact do not have
information on the entire population that I am interested in, namely, the entire population of
Arkansas, much less a direct measure of the population's involvement in constitutional
activism. Only with such information on this complete population could I know with a high
degree of certainty what the level of popular constitutional activism is in Arkansas using a
population-based analysis. Moreover, I am using the number of amendments proposed by
initiative as a proxy measure for this characteristic, a measure that is admittedly incomplete.
Thus, I use a regression analysis in this article to infer something from my data about the
overall level of popular constitutional activism and, as I will discuss in Part IV, its
relationship to the changing role of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
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Figure 9: Amendments Proposed by Initiative: 1912 to 2006
The next step to meaningfully explaining changes in popular
constitutional activism is to relate the magnitude of change to some causal
variable. I have chosen to use the time variable to do this because it acts as
a surrogate for the sociopolitical and legal developments that I identified in
Part 11.'1 4 As illustrated in Figure 9, each development is by definition tied
to specific years: when the year changes, so do the developments and factors
in that year. This interrelates the year variable with each of these
developments and allows the year variable to stand in to some extent as a
measure for each.
The interrelation in this broad period, however, is not perfect. First,
there is only a relatively weak statistical correlation between the number of
amendments proposed by initiative and the year over the period from 1912
to 2006.55 Thus, the year variable is at best a weak predictor for the number
154. See supra Part II.A.2. As described below, the Arkansas Supreme Court's
increasing role in Arkansas's constitutional process is also tied to certain periods, specifically
from the 1970s to the present.
155. The correlation, r, between the number of amendments proposed by initiative and
the year calculates to be -0.198:
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of amendments proposed by initiative in a given year during this period. 156
Moreover, the year variable is not a statistically significant predictor of the
number of initiatives proposed by initiative in this regression model. 157 This
n1 ai-
r =-- (~)(i) 0.198
See MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 153, at 124-25. The correlation between any two
variables is between -1 and 1. Id. at 125. A value of 0 indicates a very weak linear
relationship. Id. A value of -1 or 1 indicates a perfect fit between the data and the linear
regression line. Id. Therefore, the strength of this relationship increases as the correlation
value approaches -1 or 1. Id. A negative correlation indicates a negative association between
the variables, and a positive correlation indicates a positive association between the variables.
Id. In the social and behavior sciences, a correlation of 0.1 is considered a low degree of
correlation, 0.3 a medium degree of correlation, and 0.5 a large degree of correlation.
Walker, supra note 153, at 417-18 (citing JACOB COHEN & PATRICIA COHEN, APPLIED
MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 59-61 (2d
ed. 1983)). Thus, a correlation of -0.198 indicates a relatively low degree of correlation. As I
will demonstrate, although this may evince some sort of relationship between the year and the
number of amendments proposed by initiative, the import and clarity of this relationship is
muddied by a number of confounding, interrelated, and lurking variables. See infra notes
160-62 and accompanying text. If these variables are removed from the data set, as I have
attempted to do below, the strength of the relationship between the year and the number of
amendments proposed by initiative becomes evident. See infra notes 164-71 and
accompanying text.
156. In statistical analyses, the predictive power of a variable (the explanatory variable) to
explain the behavior of another variable (the response variable) is often described in terms of
the percent variance of the second variable accounted for by the first. See MOORE &
MCCABE, supra note 153, at 141-42; Walker, supra note 153, at 417-18. The percent
variance is expressed by what is known as the R2 value, which is derived from the correlation
between two variables. See MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 153, at 141-42. The R2 value
therefore is used to describe the success of a regression in explaining the response variable
with an explanatory variable. In this case then, the correlation of -0.198 corresponds to an R
2
value of 0.039, or 3.9%:
R2 = r 2 = variance of predicted values a- -0.198
2 = 3.9%variance of observed values a
Id. In other words, the R2 value indicates that only 3.9% of the variance in the number of
amendments proposed by initiative is accounted for in a given year by the regression model.
The year then is a weak predictor for the number of amendments proposed by initiative in a
given year over the 1912-2006 period because the year variable itself explains or accounts
for very little of the changes in the number of amendments proposed. See Walker, supra note
153, at 417-18.
157. The statistical significance of a variable in a complex system indicates the predictive
power of the variable for the behavior of the system. In statistical terms, significance is
defined using the variable's coefficient p-value. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 153, at 399;
MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 153, at 407. A p-value in this context is the probability that
the coefficient of the associated variable occurred by chance assuming that the null
hypothesis, the test hypothesis that the coefficient of the associated variable is zero (and thus
has no effect), is true. See MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 153, at 405. The hypothesis that
the coefficient is zero, and therefore has no impact, is conventionally rejected if the
calculated p-value is below the threshold of 0.05, or 5%, in which case the p-value is deemed
statistically significant. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 153, at 399; MOORE & MCCABE, supra
note 153, at 407. Here, the year variable's coefficient p-value in this regression is high,
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suggests that, without further information on at least the contributing factors
described above, evaluating the entire 1912 to 2006 population of data on
the number of amendments proposed by initiative based on year will be
statistically ineffective in describing the behavior of the constitutional
process in Arkansas.
Second, a given year may contain more than one of these sociopolitical
or legal developments. For example, in 1995, the reemergence of state
constitutional law and judicial federalism were well on their way around the
country and were developing in Arkansas. 158 During this year, however, the
question of whether to convene a constitutional convention was also put to
the voters. 59  The concurrence of these two distinct factors in 1995
confounds the explanatory efficacy of the year variable on the level of
popular constitutional activism at least with respect to the effect of those
factors. 160 The same problem occurs more forcefully in the late 1960s and
1970s when the reemergence of state constitutional law and judicial
federalism coincided with the zenith of constitutional convention activity in
Arkansas, and again in 1918 when a movement for wholesale constitutional
revision coincided with the introduction of the initiative power itself.
161
Because the year variable reflects each of these factors temporally, and each
factor may have a different and possibly countervailing effect on the
incidence of amendments proposed by initiative, the year variable is
ineffective across the 1912-2006 period without additional analysis.
The uncertainty inherent in the year variable, however, does not render
it completely useless. If some of the sociopolitical and legal developments
can be controlled for or removed so as to allow the year to be a more direct
and exclusive stand in for a smaller set of complicating factors, the year
could become a powerful explanatory tool for the state of popular
constitutional activism-particularly where there is a compelling causal
approximately 0.178. Infra app.1, tbl.2. In other words, the probability that the measured
coefficient for the year coefficient would be -0.0257 by chance if the value is actually 0.00 is
approximately 17.8%. Id. Thus, at the 0.05 standard, it is not possible to statistically
eliminate the hypothesis here that the coefficient for the year variable is zero. Id. (showing
that the p-value for the year variable is approximately 0.178, well above the 0.05 level of
certainty required in similar statistical analyses). It is therefore not possible to reject the view
that the impact of the year variable is zero, and it is possible that the impact of the year
variable is zero.
158. See infra Part 1V.A (describing the changing role of the Arkansas Supreme Court).
159. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
160. See MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 153, at 176 ("Two variables are confounded
when their effects on a response variable cannot be distinguished from each other. The
confounded variables may be either explanatory variables or lurking variables.").
161. Infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text; supra notes 113-15,125-50 and
accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.A.
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explanation to connect the variable and statistical results to factual
circumstances.
Attempting to account for the sociopolitical and legal developments in
each of the periods that I have described, however, is difficult at best
because these characteristics are difficult to measure meaningfully and
account for statistically other than through their associations with the year
variable. Moreover, each period is characterized by at least one factor that
likely impacted the state of popular constitutional activism as measured by
initiative-based amendments. Thus, although there are distinct periods and
seemingly apparent patterns in the development of popular constitutional
activism over the years, the inability of the year variable to account for the
sociopolitical and legal developments that helped shape those periods
counsels against attempting to monolithically model the development of
popular constitutional activism across all periods.
Therefore, the most appropriate period to evaluate is the period from
1984 to 2006 because it allows me to evaluate the effect that the increasing
role of the Arkansas Supreme Court in the constitutional process has had on
popular constitutional activism without needing to worry about other
potentially confounding developments affecting my analysis.
162
As indicated in Figures 9 and 10, the 1984 to 2006 period evidences a
pattern of decreasing numbers of initiative-based amendments that is
162. Although this period contains no broad efforts at wholesale constitutional revision
through constitutional conventions or the kind of the widespread political unrest that
disrupted the process in prior years, it does include a call for a constitutional convention in
1995. Supra note 148. I have nonetheless defined my sample period to include the entire
1984 to 2006 span. First, the 1995 request for a constitutional convention put to the voters
failed. Supra note 148. This failure suggests that the impact of activities surrounding the
proposed constitutional convention was not significant, or at least not as significant as the
impact of activities related to constitutional conventions that were actually called and yielded
a proposal for a wholesale revision of the constitution. Moreover, unlike prior attempts at
constitutional convention-based revision, the 1995 proposal did not enjoy wide initial popular
or political support and in the end it was defeated by eighty percent of the voting electorate.
Supra note 148. Second, the 1995 call for a constitutional convention is the only instance of
such activity in the 1984 to 2006 population sample. This is in contrast to the flurry of
constitutional conventions and proposed constitutional revisions that characterized the early
years of the 1966 to 2006 period. As such, the impact of such an isolated push, particularly
one that failed, is likely not to be as great as the prior more frequent attempts at constitutional
revision by convention that enjoyed far wider support. Third, a large sample size is generally
more informative of overall patterns and relationships than a small sample size, such as a
sample that was limited to, say, 1996 to 2006. The benefits of a sample twice the size of the
alternative without the 1995 convention activity are controlling over the low marginal costs
to the analysis caused by including the 1995 call for a constitutional convention in the
sample. Fourth, there is a distinct and quite remarkable pattern evident from 1984 to 2006
data. Evaluating the nuances of this pattern may in itself be both fascinating and uniquely
helpful to the analysis of the impact of the changing role of the Arkansas Supreme Court on
popular constitutional activism that is at the heart of this article.
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reflected in the downward-sloping linear regression line shown in Figure
10.163 Unlike the 1912 to 2006 period, however, this pattern is more
pronounced and far more statistically significant in describing the behavior
of popular constitutional activism during the 1984 to 2006 period. First,
there is a quantifiable and statistically significant decrease in the number of
amendments proposed by initiative that occurred between the beginning of
the sample period in 1984 and the end of the sample period in 2006.'64 In
other words, the decline indicated by the trend line in Figure 10 does not
appear to be due to simple randomness. Second, the regression reflected by
the linear regression line in Figure 10 shows a very high negative
correlation between the year variable and the number of amendments
proposed by initiative that is much higher than the relatively low correlation
between the year and the number of amendments proposed by initiative
across the entire 1912 to 2006 period. 65 This extremely high correlation in
163. This regression line can be described with the following predictive equation:







164. To determine if the apparent drop in the number of amendments proposed by
initiative across the 1984 to 2006 time period is statistically significant, it is useful to
compare the mean of the first six data points (1984 to 1994) with the mean of the last six data
points (1996 to 2006) using a t-test evaluation. MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 153, at 485-
503 (describing two-sample analysis). The hypothesis to be tested here is whether the first
group's population mean is greater than the second group's population mean. This would
indicate that a statistically significant decrease in the number of amendments proposed by
initiative occurred between the beginning of the sample period, 1984, and the end of the
sample period, 2006. Conversely, the null hypothesis is that the population means are equal.
The latter circumstance would indicate that a statistically significant drop from the mean of
the early years of the period, 1984 to 1994, to the mean of the later years, 1996 to 2006, did
not occur. This would in turn suggest that there was not a statistically significant effect on
the number of amendments proposed by initiative over the sample time period. As described
below, the difference in the means of the early years from the later years is statistically
significant. The data therefore suggests a statistically significant tendency for a decreasing
number of constitutional amendments proposed by initiative in Arkansas over the period
from 1984 to 2006.
To reach this conclusion, I used the t-test function in Microsoft Excel to calculate the
probability of whether the difference in means between the groups, which corresponds to
2.33 and 1.66 respectively, is statistically significant. I calculated the probability to be
approximately 0.05, or right at the 0.05 level of significance. See, e.g., Walker, supra note
153, at 399 (describing 0.05 in this context as the threshold at or below which a statistical
change is conventionally deemed statistically significant); MOORE & MCCABE, supra note
153, at 407 (same). At this level of significance, I can reject the hypothesis that the
population means are equal and can conclude that the mean of the first group of years, 1984
to 1994, is statistically greater than the mean of the second group of years, 1996 to 2006.
165. The correlation for the 1912 to 2006 period is -0.198. Supra note 155. In contrast,
the correlation between the number of amendments proposed by initiative and the year
variable for the 1984-2006 period calculates to be -0.698:
2009]
UALR LAW REVIEW
turn demonstrates that when other confounding factors are removed from
the data set, the correlation between the year and the number of amendments
proposed by initiative in a given year becomes clearer.166 Third and finally,
based on this extremely high correlation, approximately 48.7% of the
variance in the number of amendments proposed by initiative is accounted
for in a given year by the linear regression used to model the data in Figure
lO's trend line. 67 This percentage is extraordinarily high and suggests that
the year variable provides a very successful mathematical explanation for
the number of initiative-based amendments proposed in a given year and, by
r = 1 C-a (ZE:2)=- 698
See MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 153, at 124-25. In a social science such as this one, a
correlation of -0.698 represents an unmistakably strong connection. See generally Walker,
supra note 153, at 417-18.
166. It is, of course, possible that there may be additional variables that are interrelated to
or reflected by the year variable that may be influential in this analysis but are not explicitly
covered here. The focus in this article, however, has been to identify the major statistical
factors in the level of popular participation in the state constitutional process. Any such
hidden "lurking" variables, while important, are likely to be themselves covered under the
ambit of major factors that I have identified here: the presence of constitutional conventions,
the level of civil and political unrest, the increasing role of the Arkansas Supreme Court, and
the reemergence of state constitutional law.
In addition, the linear regression model based on the year variable as applied to the
1984 to 2006 period and reflected in Figure 1O's trend line yields a year coefficient that is
non-zero and statistically significant. In other words, the calculated coefficient for the year
variable did not occur by chance and it is statistically significant in the prediction of the
number of amendments proposed by initiative during the 1984 to 2006 period. See supra
fig.10; infra app.1, tbl.3. This observation is based on the year variable's coefficient p-value
for the 1984 to 2006 period. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 153, at 399; MOORE & MCCABE,
supra note 153, at 407; infra app.1, tbl.3. Calculated to be 0.011, the year variable's
coefficient p-value for the 1984 to 2006 period is much lower than the year variable's
coefficient p-value for the 1912 to 2006 period. See infra app.1, tbl.2 infra app. 1, tbl.2-3
(noting that the year variable's coefficient p-value for the 1912 to 2006 period is 0.178). At
0.011, this value is also lower than the standard 0.05 threshold used in statistical analysis to
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 153, at 399;
MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 153, at 407. As a result, we can reject the hypothesis that the
year variable's calculated coefficient is zero, that is, we can reject the hypothesis that the
calculated coefficient occurred by chance. We can therefore further say that the year
coefficient is non-zero and its predictive power to describe the number of initiative-based
amendments proposed across the 1984 to 2006 period is statistically significant.
167. As described above, the percent variance in the number of amendments proposed by
initiative in a given year accounted for by the regression model employed in this article is
described using the R2 value, which is in turn based on the correlation between two variables,
the response variable and the explanatory variable. In this case, these variables correspond to
the number of amendments proposed by initiative in a given year and the year variable
respectively. With respect to the period from 1984 to 2006, the R2 value calculates to be
0.487, or 48.7%:
R2 = r 2 = variance of predicted values . - 0.6982 = 48.7%
variance of observed values a
See MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 153, at 141-42.
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extension, the statistically significant decline in the number of amendments
proposed by initiative that has occurred since 1984.168
Figure 10: Amendments Proposed by Initiative: 1984 to 2006
The statistical significance of using the year variable to describe the
behavior of popular constitutional activism from 1984 to 2006, however,
does not sufficiently explain this behavior because numbers alone cannot
tell the whole story, particularly where the numbers attempt to describe
circumstances that are difficult to measure statistically-which is exactly the
case here. Therefore, in order to adequately explain the state of popular
constitutional activism during this period, it is necessary to find a
compelling causal explanation that connects the statistical significance of
the year variable to the decline in popular constitutional activism over time
as objectively reflected by the incidence of initiative-based amendments
reaching the people in a given year. In other words, it is necessary to
explain why popular constitutional activism has declined over time in order
to validate and give meaning to the statistical observations outlined above.
168. See Walker, supra note 153, at 417-18; supra notes 164-66.
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In Part IV below, I argue that the increasing role of the Arkansas Supreme
Court in the use and development of state constitutional law can provide just
such an explanation.
IV. THE INCREASING CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE ARKANSAS SUPREME
COURT
At the beginning of this article, I asked: to what extent has Arkansas's
tradition of popular constitutional activism been affected by the ascendancy
of the Arkansas Supreme Court? The answer to this question began with the
indications above that Arkansas's tradition of popular constitutional
activism appears to be changing. Indeed, from 1984 to 2006, the level of the
people's participation in the constitutional process has declined to its lowest
levels in history. 169 Absent from this period, however, are the kinds of
events that have likely impacted popular constitutional activism in the past.
There was no widespread political or civil unrest, nor were there widely-
supported attempts at wholesale constitutional revision by constitutional
conventions. 170  In the absence of such potentially confounding and
countervailing developments, the strong negative correlation between the
year variable and the number of initiative-based amendments proposed in a
given year suggests that another development occurring during this period
may be causally related to the decline in popular constitutional activism and
may also explain why the incidence of popular constitutional activism has
declined in the way it has over the past four decades.
I argue that the only other major development that occurred during this
same period has been the changing constitutional role of the Arkansas
Supreme Court. Based on this coincidence and the quality of the court's
expansion of its substantive role in the constitutional process described
below, I conclude that the increasing role of the Arkansas Supreme Court
has negatively affected Arkansas's tradition of popular involvement in the
constitutional process, and it has done so by providing a ready means to
control state action and depressing the use of the people's primary
instrument for effecting constitutional change: the popular initiative.
As described below, the court has demonstrably expanded its role in
the constitutional process in at least three key areas: (1) the protection of
individual rights based on the Arkansas Constitution; (2) the court's ability
and willingness to decide important cases and involve itself in public policy;
and (3) the evaluation of the sufficiency of constitutional-initiative
proposals.
169. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
170. E.g., supra note 162.
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A. The Protection of Individual Rights Based on the Arkansas
Constitution
Perhaps the most significant area in which the Arkansas Supreme Court
has expanded its role in the Arkansas state constitutional process is in the
court's use of the Arkansas Constitution as a font for protecting individual
rights. Although the court has always been the ultimate authority on the
Arkansas Constitution,'71 it has only relatively recently begun to take an
active role in the protection of individual rights using Arkansas's own
constitutional system. 172 Indeed, as at least one commentator has observed,
the Arkansas Supreme Court was arguably not a meaningful source of state
constitutional law, much less a significant source of constitutional
protections, before the year 2000.173 That apparent paradigm, however,
clearly began to change in 2000, when the court decided the first in a series
of important cases that identified significant new individual rights based on
Arkansas's state constitution and the Arkansas Supreme Court's
precedents. 74 In doing so, the court began to set the bar for Arkansas's state
constitutional protections higher than those afforded by the Federal
Constitution or interpretations of the Arkansas Constitution that tracked with
federal protections, and definitively announced the (re)emergence of state
constitutional law and judicial federalism in Arkansas as key dimensions of
Arkansas's constitutional framework.
In order to highlight the significance of this development, it is first
necessary to briefly review the national development of such judicial
federalism and the attendant reemergence of state constitutional law in the
protection of individual rights. Judicial federalism is the "phenomenon
where state courts interpret their state constitutions to provide more rights
than recognized by the [Federal Constitution] .,,175 The emergence of
judicial federalism and the increasing utilization of state constitutional law
in the modem era, often referred to by many commentators as new judicial
federalism, is often traced back to the 1970s. 176  Before the 1970s, and
171. ARK. CONST. art. VII; id. amend. LXXX.
172. Williams, supra note 1. See generally BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 225
(describing the role that the Arkansas Supreme Court has played in the state).
173. Williams, supra note 1, at 883-86.
174. See infra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
175. Williams, supra note 1, at 883.
176. See, e.g., id.; Greg Hollon, After the Federalization Binge: A Civil Liberties
Hangover, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 499, 521-22 (1996). As Chief Justice Jim Hannah of
the Supreme Court of Arkansas recently commented, the term "New Judicial Federalism" is
an unfortunate one for this topic because it simply is not new. Jim Hannah, Forgotten Law
and Judicial Duty, 70 ALB. L. REv. 829, 832 (2007).
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extending back to the early twentieth century, state constitutional law was
relatively silent in American jurisprudence.1 77 Prior to the 1930s, however,
much of the law was primarily governed by state constitutions, particularly
with respect to the criminal law. 178 But following the Supreme Court's 1932
decision in Powell v. Alabama and continuing through the Warren and
Burger courts, the utilization of state constitutional law began to wane in
favor of both the federal and state courts' increasing reliance on interpreting
and applying new requirements found under the Federal Constitution.
79
Yet state constitutional traditions had not disappeared, and by the
1970s, state courts had once again begun to use state constitutions in the
first instance and construe state constitutional protections as exceeding those
provided by similar measures in the Federal Constitution. 80 The increasing
importance of state constitutions was brought into specific relief by the
United States Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Oregon v. Hass.'8' In that
case, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the ability of state
courts to interpret the United States Constitution to provide greater
protection than the Supreme Court's own federal constitutional precedents
provide. 182 As the Court would note in Arkansas v. Sullivan nearly twenty-
five years later, while a state is free "as a matter of its own law" to provide
greater protections for individual rights than those the United States
Supreme Court "holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional
standards," a state court "may not impose such greater restrictions as a
matter of federal constitutional law when [the United States Supreme Court]
specifically refrains from imposing them."' 
83
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hass and the trends in the
nation's federal and state courts to rely principally on the Federal
Constitution in addressing individual rights, Justice William Brennan,
177. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1985).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1147.
180. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977). Justice Brennan describes in some detail the historical
steps that brought American jurisprudence back to the state courthouse; among those was the
increasing incorporation of federal constitutional protections against state actions through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 490-95. These steps, although fascinating, are beyond the
scope of this article.
181. 420 U.S. 714, 719 & n.4 (1975).
182. Id.
183. 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (quoting Hass, 420 U.S. at 719) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court in Hass similarly observed that although "a State is free as a matter of
its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be
necessary upon federal constitutional standards," it "may not impose such greater restrictions
as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing
them." 420 U.S. at 719.
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among others, began to champion the importance of state constitutional law
and encourage the use of state constitutional law to protect individual
rights.' 84 By the end of the 1970s, this vision of judicial federalism was off
to the races across the country. Indeed, many state high courts, as the
ultimate arbiters of what their own constitutions mean, enthusiastically
embraced this resurgence 185 and have been at the forefront ever since. These
courts have acted in the years following the so-called reemergence of state
constitutional law to construct a complex landscape of constitutionally-
based protections specific to the constitutions of the individual states.
186
Similarly, Arkansas's case law during this period also reflects a long
judicial history of "protect[ing] individual rights greater than the federal
floor."' 187 As early as 1978, the Arkansas Supreme Court had recognized the
role of state constitutions in securing "basic and fundamental rights which
our state and federal constitutions secure to every arrestee" from invasions
184. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 180, at 502-03 (calling on the state courts to provide
the level of protection needed to protect important individual rights as a result of the federal
courts' abdication of their federalism role, and entrusting to the state courts the role of
adequately "safeguard[ing] individual rights").
185. For example, early decisions from California, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania during this
period were very supportive of the independence of state constitutions from the mandates of
the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 280 (Cal. 1976)
("We... reaffirm the independent nature of the California Constitution and our responsibility
to separately define and protect the rights of California citizens despite conflicting decisions
of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal Constitution."); Accord
Commonwealth v. Triplett, 341 A.2d 62 (Pa. 1975); State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657 (Haw.
1971).
186. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, Rights, in STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 7-27 (G. Alan Tarr &
Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) [hereinafter AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM];
JAMES A. GARDNER, STATE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999).
187. Jegley v. Picado, 340 Ark. 600, 631, 637-38, 80 S.W.3d 332, 349, 353-54 (2002);
see, e.g., Fouse v. State, 337 Ark. 13, 23, 989 S.W.2d 146, 150-51 (1999); Garner v. State,
307 Ark. 353, 357-58, 820 S.W.2d 446, 449-50 (1991); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30,
279 Ark. 340, 349, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95 (1983); Bolden v. State, 262 Ark. 718, 722-23, 561
S.W.2d 281, 284 (1978); Pryor v. Lowe, 258 Ark. 188, 192, 523 S.W.2d 199, 202 (1975);
Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973). As the court in Jegley observed, the
Arkansas Supreme Court has also been on the forefront in recognizing a right to privacy in
the civil tort context. 349 Ark. at 631, 80 S.W.3d at 349 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee,
348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634 (2002); Young v. Rice, 308 Ark. 593, 826 S.W.2d 252 (1992);
Dunlap v. McCarty, 248 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984); Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co.,
265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979); Olan Mills v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22




by the government. 188 Other cases show that the Arkansas Supreme Court
has been willing to rule on state constitutional questions, at least in cases
where there were no direct federal constitutional provisions on point. 189 Yet,
these cases do not specifically articulate the independent reliance on the
state constitution in the identification and protection of individual rights
above the level that may be protected by the Federal Constitution. 190
The Arkansas Supreme Court's stated approach to individual rights,
however, began to change in 2000 when the court decided State v.
Sullivan.19' In Sullivan, the Arkansas Supreme Court announced for the first
time that pretextual police arrests' 92 were "unconstitutional"--notably
without defining its specific constitutional analysis. 193 Instead, the court
articulated its decision based on its interpretation of a 1932 United States
Supreme Court decision using Arkansas precedents that purported to
establish that "an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for
evidence."' 194
The Arkansas Supreme Court subsequently denied the State's petition
for rehearing, but in doing so, it addressed for the first time the State's new
argument that the court's use of pretext in the context of police searches was
contrary to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United
States.195  The court held that Whren did not prevent a court from
invalidating a search based on pretext, reasoning that although Whren was
188. Bolden, 262 Ark. at 724, 561 S.W.2d at 284 (emphasis added).
189. DuPree, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90; Pryor, 258 Ark. at 192, 523 S.W.2d at 202
(holding that limitations placed upon the delegates to a state constitutional convention by a
legislative act are void).
190. See Williams, supra note 1, at 883-86 (arguing that the Arkansas Supreme Court did
not enter into this so-called era of new judicial federalism until as late as 2000, beginning
with the court's decision in State v. Sullivan); see also, e.g., Fouse, 337 Ark. at 23, 989
S.W.2d at 150-51 ("The privacy of citizens in their homes, secure from nighttime intrusions,
is a right of vast importance as attested not only by our Rules but also by our state and
federal constitutions." (emphasis added)); Garner, 307 Ark. at 357-58, 820 S.W.2d at 449-
50.
191. State v. Sullivan (Sullivan 1), 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526 (2000), reh'g denied,
340 Ark. 318, 16 S.W.3d 551 (2000), rev'd, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam).
192. A pretextual arrest by police "is an arrest that would not have occurred but for an
ulterior investigative motive." Dickerson v. State, 363 Ark. 437, 448, 214 S.W.3d 811, 820
(2005) (citing State v. Sullivan (Sullivan I11), 348 Ark. 647, 655, 74 S.W.3d 215, 221
(2002)).
193. SullivanI, 340 Ark. at 317-18, 11 S.W.3d at 527-28.
194. Id. at 318, 11 S.W.3d at 527 (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932)). As framed by the court, the issue was the propriety of Sullivan's arrest, that is,
whether the police officer had information that Sullivan was involved in drug activity when
the officer initially stopped him, but did not have cause to believe Sullivan's car contained
drugs based on the stop itself Id. at 316-18, 11 S.W.3d at 526-28.
195. State v. Sullivan (Sullivan 11), 340 Ark. 315, 16 S.W.3d 551 (2000) (discussing
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
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broadly written, it did not provide "blanket authority for pretextual arrests
for purposes of a search in all cases."' 196 Interestingly, the court also noted
that several other state jurisdictions had similarly refused to give such
authority based either on state constitutional principles or
unreasonableness.1 97 This suggests that the court may have intended to
announce a state constitutional rule, not a rule arising from the Federal
Constitution per se.
The court, however, went on to support its interpretation of federal
constitutional precedent by opining that "nothing ... prevent[ed] [it] from
interpreting the Constitution more broadly than the United States Supreme
Court, which has the effect of providing more rights."'198  On appeal,
however, the United States Supreme Court reversed largely based on that
reasoning. 199 The Court held that its precedents precluded state high courts
from interpreting the Federal Constitution to provide more rights than the
United States Supreme Court's own federal constitutional precedents
recognized. 200  The Court then remanded the case back to the Arkansas
Supreme Court for further proceedings in light of its decision. 20 ,
On remand, the Arkansas Supreme Court again addressed the issue of
pretextual arrests.20 2 This time, however, the court found the very same
rights identified in its original decisions as protected under the Arkansas
Constitution,20 3 thereby completing the Arkansas Supreme Court's adoption
of the Arkansas Constitution as a powerful source of individual rights.
In the years since Sullivan, the Arkansas Supreme Court has continued
this approach and has decided several important cases involving individual
rights based solely on the Arkansas Constitution. For example, in the
court's 2002 Jegley v. Picado decision, the court struck down a statute that
criminalized same-sex sodomy, but not opposite-sex sodomy, under the
Arkansas Constitution.204 After observing that the federal right to privacy
196. Id. at 318, 16 S.W.3d at 552.
197. Id. at 318, 16 S.W.3d at 552 (citing to courts in Washington, Minnesota, New York,
and Arizona).
198. Id. at 318, 16 S.W.3d at 552.
199. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-72 (2001) (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714,719 (1975)).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 772.
202. State v. Sullivan (Sullivan 111), 348 Ark. 647, 655-57, 74 S.W.3d 215, 221-22
(2002).
203. Id. at 657-58, 74 S.W.3d at 222.
204. 349 Ark. 600, 632, 638, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350, 353-54 (2002) (invalidating ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Repl. 1997)).
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did not encompass a right to engage in same-sex conduct, °5 the court held
that the Arkansas Constitution did protect an individual's right to engage in
same-sex conduct under the Arkansas Constitution's fundamental right to
privacy and Arkansas's Equal Rights Amendment.20 6 Similarly, the court
struck down a state regulation in 2006 that banned homosexual individuals
from serving as foster parents, or even living in the same home as foster
children.20 7 Interestingly, the court invalidated the regulation based on a
violation of the Arkansas Constitution's separation of powers doctrine, but
did not reach the arguments that the regulation violated the equal protection
and privacy protections of the Arkansas Constitution.20 8 Rather, the court
205. Id. at 624, 80 S.W.3d at 344-45. At the time Jegley was decided in 2002, the
controlling United States Supreme Court precedent, Bowers v. Hardwick, provided that the
Federal Constitution conferred no fundamental right to engage in same-sex sexual conduct.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there was no federal right to engage
in same-sex sodomy). The Arkansas Supreme Court relied on the holding in Bowers in
finding that the federal right to privacy did not protect a right to engage in same-sex sexual
conduct. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 623-24, 80 S.W.3d at 344-45. Bowers, however, was expressly
overruled in 2003, a year after Jegley was decided. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(invalidating the criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct based (somewhat unclearly) on
the Federal Constitution). For more information on the Lawrence decision, see Jerald A.
Sharum, Comment, Controlling Conduct: The Emerging Protection of Sodomy in the
Military, 69 ALB. L. REv. 1195 (2006).
206. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 636-37, 80 S.W.3d at 350, 353-54. The precision with which
the Arkansas Supreme Court identified the constitutional analysis and standard of review that
it used to invalidate the offending statute stands in stark contrast to the confusing
argumentation the United States Supreme Court used in Lawrence. See Lawrence, 539 U.S.
558; Sharum, supra note 205.
207. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Howard, 367 Ark. 55, 66, 238 S.W.3d 1, 8 (2006). The
offending regulation read: "No person may serve as a foster parent if any adult member of
that person's household is a homosexual." Id. at 58, 238 S.W.3d at 3 (citing section 200.3.2
of the Minimum Licensing Standards for Child Welfare Agencies). The regulation defined
"homosexual" as
any person who voluntarily and knowingly engages in or submits to any sexual
contact involving the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another
person of the same gender, and who has engaged in such activity after the foster
home is approved or at a point in time that is reasonably close in time to the filing
of the application to be a foster parent.
Id. (citing section 200.3.2 of the Minimum Licensing Standards for Child Welfare Agencies).
208. Id. at 57-58, 66, 238 S.W.3d at 3, 8-9. In 2008, the people of Arkansas approved a
statutory (but not constitutional) measure by initiative that prohibits unmarried, cohabiting
individuals from serving as foster parents: "A minor may not be adopted or placed in a foster
home if the individual seeking to adopt or to serve as a foster parent is cohabitating with a
sexual partner outside of a marriage which is valid under the constitution and laws of this
state." Arkansas Elections, Proposed Initiative Act No. 1, Statewide Results by Contest,
http://www.arelections.org/index.php?ac:show:conteststatewide = 1 &elecid=l 81 &contestid=
5 (last visited Sept. 8, 2009); Proposed Initiative Act No. 1 (2008), available at
http://www.votenaturally.org/2008_elections/ProposedInitiative Act Nol.pdf (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-8-304 (West Supp. 2009)) [hereinafter "2008 Adoption Statute"]. It is
unclear whether this development will precipitate further involvement by the court on the
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agreed with the trial court that the state agency that promulgated the
regulation acted outside its authority by attempting to legislate morality, and
invalidated the regulation on the narrow separation of powers issue.
20 9
As described above, the Arkansas Supreme Court's decisions over the
past four decades highlight the court's evolving approach to individual
rights. In a subtle but enduring jurisprudential shift that appears to have
begun in the 1970s, the Arkansas Supreme Court's role in protecting
individual rights has expanded to one characterized by the court's
increasingly active involvement in the protection of individual rights and its
increasing willingness to use the Arkansas Constitution as a ready source for
individual rights. Instead of exclusively relying on the Federal Constitution
to protect individual rights, or on both the Federal and Arkansas
Constitutions, the court now appears to be comfortable using the Arkansas
Constitution as an independent and sufficient basis to protect individual
rights.
2 10
issue of adoption by same-sex couples or homosexual individuals because the act specifically
applies to both same-sex and opposite-sex individuals. 2008 Adoption Statute, supra. I
would, however, expect the Arkansas Supreme Court or a federal court to review the act
because it creates a classification based only on the marital status of the person or persons
seeking to adopt or serve as a foster parent.
209. See Howard, 367 Ark. at 66, 238 S.W.3d at 8-9.
210. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460, 465-66, 156 S.W.3d 722, 727 (2004) (citing
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); Jegley, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332; State v.
Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 74 S.W.3d 215 (2002); and Griffin v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 67 S.W.3d
582, (2002)). The court, however, may have recently signaled a change in at least its method
of interpreting the requirements of the Arkansas Constitution if not a renewed unwillingness
to interpret the Arkansas Constitution differently than the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted similar provisions in the Federal Constitution. See State v. Stites, 2009 Ark. 154,
9-10, _ S.W.3d _; Jerald Sharum, Court Signals Departure from "New" Judicial
Federalism, HOGLAW.ORG, Mar. 25, 2009, available at
http://www.hoglaw.org/home/2009/3/25/court-signals-departure-from-new-judicial-
federalism.html [hereinafter Court Signals Departure]. In Stites, the court stated, notably
without supporting authority, that it will only depart from the federal precedent in
interpreting the Arkansas Constitution when "justified." Stites, 2009 Ark. 154, at 9-10, _
S.W.3d at __. Moreover, the court went on to say that it would make such a determination
using a balancing analysis. Id. at 9-10, __ S.W.3d at _. Under this analysis, the court
balanced its "duty to interpret [Arkansas's] state constitution and follow [Arkansas's] state
law" with the effects of "deviating too much from federal precedent base[d] solely on
[Arkansas's] state constitution." Id. at 10, _ S.W.3d at _ (emphasis added) (quoting
dicta in Brown, 356 Ark. at 470, 156 S.W.3d at 729). Between these two "interests," the
court argued, a "proper balance must be struck." Id. at 10, - S.W.3d at - (quoting dicta
inBrown, 356 Ark. at 470, 156 S.W.3d at 729). This analysis, however, appears to
effectively create a presumption that the Arkansas Constitution merely restates the applicable
federal standard and that the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of that standard is
the starting point of Arkansas's state constitutional law tradition. Sharum, Court Signals
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This evolution has also been visible to the public. Aside from direct
news coverage of its decisions, the court's involvement in hot-button issues
such as gay rights and adoption in a largely socially conservative state
certainly roused the "interests and passions" of many Arkansans more so
than it has likely ever done in the past.211
Such an assumption of the court's province over individual rights into
the public psyche may therefore explain the statistically significant decline
in the number of initiative-based amendments that occurred during the same
period. In such a situation, the people of Arkansas may have become
accustomed to the Arkansas Supreme Court's involvement in the resolution
of individual rights, and simply began to increasingly defer to the court's
new role in the area instead of using its own powers to resolve controversial
issues of individual rights. Perhaps more likely, the people are simply
becoming more comfortable using the courts to resolve issues instead of
using constitutional initiatives.
B. Ability and Willingness of the Arkansas Supreme Court to Review
Important Cases and Involve Itself in Public Policy
The second area in which the Arkansas Supreme Court's authority has
expanded is the scope of cases that the court can review and the court's
willingness to involve itself in political and public policy issues. As
explained below, these expansions are based on the Arkansas Supreme
Court (1) becoming a certiorari court and (2) sanctioning so-called
compliance trials of state policies.
1. The Arkansas Supreme Court as a True Certiorari Court
Perhaps the most important development in this aspect of the court's
increasing role in the constitutional process is procedural and came in 1997
when the court became a true certiorari court by its own per curiam order.212
Departure, supra. Such a presumption would represent a remarkable departure from the
court's recent jurisprudence, which expressly used the state's constitutional traditions and
state law as the starting point for interpreting Arkansas's state constitutional requirements.
See id. (citing Brown, 356 Ark, at 467, 156 S.W.3d at 727); see also Hannah, supra note 176,
at 829-33.
211. See BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 223 (citing Calvin R. Ledbetter Jr., The
Arkansas Supreme Court: 1958-59, at 142 (1961) (PhD dissertation, Northwestern Univ.));
infra text accompanying note 215.
212. Robert L. Brown, The Arkansas Supreme Court: The Job and How It Has Changed,




As a certiorari court, like the United States Supreme Court, the Arkansas
Supreme Court became empowered to "take appeals in all cases of public
significance and cases of first impression where development of the law is
necessary. 213
By comparison, before 1997 the court only heard appeals in certain
kinds of cases, particularly those involving life and death sentences, wills,
torts, and statutory interpretation.21 4 A 1961 study of the Arkansas Supreme
Court characterized the court as merely a "private law court" that did not
consider "many of the great political issues of the day" and whose decisions
did not "arouse the interest and passions of the citizenry. 215 Under this
tradition, the court did not take "direct appeals for several categories of
cases, like property and contract cases, and even espoused a policy that the
court of appeals might be wrong in a case but that, by itself, was not grounds
for review.
', 216
It is not surprising that such an expansion in the court's jurisdiction and
purpose coincided with an increase in the court's constitutional and political
power. Indeed, the ability of a state high court to engage in the appellate
development of state constitutional law is at the very essence of any
involvement in that state's constitutional process by that court.
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a), (b).
213. Brown, supra note 212; see ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a), (b). As the court now provides
in its Rules, the court may transfer to itself any case involving:
(1) issues of first impression,
(2) issues upon which there is a perceived inconsistency in the decisions of the
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court,
(3) issues involving federal constitutional interpretation,
(4) issues of substantial public interest,
(5) significant issues needing clarification or development of the law, or overruling
of precedent, and
(6) appeals involving substantial questions of law concerning the validity,
construction, or interpretation of an act of the General Assembly, ordinance of a
municipality or county, or a rule or regulation of any court, administrative agency,
or regulatory body.
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(b). The court, however, has indicated that it will only issue a writ of
certiorari when it is clear from the record that there has been a "plain, manifest, clear, and
gross abuse of discretion, and there is no other adequate remedy." Conner v. Simes, 355 Ark.
422,428, 139 S.W.3d 476, 480 (2003).
214. Brown, supra note 212.
215. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 223 (citing Ledbetter, supra note 211, at 142).




2. DuPree, Lake View, and the Development of Compliance Trials to
Actively Evaluate State Policies
In addition to the Arkansas Supreme Court's increasing willingness to
use its constitutional authority to protect individual rights and its expansion
of its appellate authority, the court has also been willing to become actively
involved in the political and public policy processes using so-called
"compliance trials." Perhaps the best example of this comes from the
court's involvement in public school funding.
Beginning in 1983, the court decided a series of cases that found
Arkansas's system of public school funding to be unconstitutional under the
Arkansas Constitution. 17 First among these decisions was DuPree v. Alma
School District No. 30, the 1983 decision in which the court found that the
state's school-funding formula was unconstitutional because it violated the
Arkansas Constitution's equal protection guarantee by denying "educational
opportunity to children in poor school districts. 218  In reaching this
conclusion, the court went beyond the express educational requirements in
the Arkansas Constitution that public education be a "general, suitable and
efficient system [of free public schools]. 2 19 Instead, the court also relied on
the state constitution's equal protection clause to invalidate the state's
school-funding formula:
For some districts to supply the barest necessities and others to
have programs generously endowed does not meet the
requirements of the constitution. Bare and minimal sufficiency
does not translate into equal educational opportunity. Equal
protection is not addressed to minimal sufficiency but rather to the
unjustifiable inequalities of state action.22 °
Importantly, the court also announced its "narrow" role in the review of
the state's educational system:
Our task is... to determine whether the trial court committed
prejudicial legal error in determining whether the state school
financing system at issue before it was violative of our state
constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws
insofar as it denies equal educational opportunity to the public
217. See generally BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 223, 315-23.
218. 279 Ark. 340, 350, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95 (1983).
219. Id. at 342, 651 S.W.2d at 91 (citing ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1).
220. Id. at 347, 651 S.W.2d at 93 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Interestingly, the court articulated the application of Arkansas's equal protection guarantee by
referencing language from San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
89 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Dupree, 279 Ark. at 346, 651 S.W.2d at 93.
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school students of this state. If we determine that no such error
occurred, we must affirm the trial court's judgment, leaving the
matter of achieving a constitutional system to the body equipped
and designed to perform that function.221
The court also noted the primary role of the state government's
political branches in evaluating education and the court's constitutional
subordination to the state in this area:
We have discussed the two major problems faced in financing
our state's educational system. The first is the obvious disparity
in property wealth among districts. That wealth is what primarily
dictates the amount of revenue each district receives and the
quality of education in that district. The second problem is the
manner in which the state determines how the state funds are
distributed, and as we have said, the current system is not a
rational one. The end result is a violation of the mandates of our
constitution. Ultimately, the responsibility for maintaining a
general, suitable and efficient school system falls upon the state.
"Whether the state acts directly or imposes the role upon the local
government, the end product must be what the constitution
commands. [When a district falls short of the constitutional
requirements], whatever the reasons for the violation, the
obligation is the state's to rectify it. If local government fails, the
state government must compel it to act, and if the local
government cannot carry the burden, the state must itself meet its
continuing obligation." Serrano in addressing the same problem
notes also the limits of judicial interpretation on this issue. The
comments are worth repeating:
The dispositive answer to the above arguments is simply that
this court is not now engaged in-nor is it about to undertake-
the "search for tax equity" which defendants prefigure. As
defendants themselves recognize, it is the Legislature which by
221. Dupree, 279 Ark. at 349-50, 651 S.W.2d at 95 (citing Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d
929, 946 (1976)). Under this approach, the court is also willing to defer to the trial court's
determination of constitutionality, and review it only for "prejudicial legal error." Id. at 349-
50, 651 S.W.2d at 95. This deference to the trial court is perhaps not surprising insofar as it
preceded the court's transition to a true certiorari court that could fully review such issues.
See supra Part IV.B. 1.
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virtue of institutional competency as well as constitutional
function is assigned that difficult and perilous quest.222
This language is striking when compared to the court's later detailed
involvement in evaluating the actions of the state to create constitutionally
"adequate" public education and ensuring that the state follows the court's
constitutional instructions. Not surprisingly, the decision prompted the
state's political branches to address school funding.223
Yet, despite the changes made between 1983 and 1994 in response to
the court's decision, a chancery court224 held in 1994 that the state
distribution formula established in response to DuPree was still
unconstitutional because of funding disparities under the Arkansas
Constitution's equal protection and education provisions.225  The court
ordered the state to "enact and implement appropriate legislation" within
226two years to correct the constitutional violations.
This decision prompted the state to repeatedly revisit education funding
in the political and public policy contexts for the next decade.227 This
resulted in the enactment of several laws in 1995 that repealed the old
funding system, required school districts to levy a base millage rate, and
provided for state funding, as well as the adoption of Amendment 74 to the
Arkansas Constitution in 1996, which definitively allowed for these
222. Dupree, 279 Ark. at 349, 651 S.W.2d at 95 (alteration in original) (citing Serrano,
557 P.2d at 946).
223. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 315-19.
224. The chancery court judge in this case was Annabelle Clinton Imber, a future justice
of the Arkansas Supreme Court. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View III),
340 Ark. 481, 487, 10 S.W.3d 892, 895 n.3 (2000).
225. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Tucker (Lake View 1), No. 92-5318 (Chancery Ct.
Nov. 9, 1994) (Imber, J.); see Lake View 111, 340 Ark. at 484-89, 310 S.W.3d at 893-99
(recounting the procedural history of the Lake View cases); BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at
319-20; Cynthia Howell, Judge Gives State 2 Years to Make School Funding Constitutional,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Nov. 10, 1994, at IA. Specifically, the court found that
Arkansas's school funding violated sections 2, 3, and 18 of article II (equal protection
provisions) and section 1 of article XIV. Lake View I, No. 92-5318; see also Lake View III,
340 Ark. at 484-93, 10 S.W.3d at 893-99. Interestingly, the trial court found that Arkansas's
school funding did not run afoul of the Federal Constitution. Lake View 1, No. 92-5318; see
also Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 (Lake View 11), 323 Ark. 693, 917 S.W.2d 530
(1996).
226. Lake View I, No. 92-5318; see also Lake View 111, 340 Ark. at 484, 10 S.W.3d at 895
(noting that the court in Lake View I stayed its order for the state to "implement a
constitutional system 'in conformity with [its] opinion"' for two years (citing Lake View 1));
BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 319-20.
227. BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 320-21; see also Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v.
Huckabee (Lake View P), 351 Ark. 31,43-46, 91 S.W.3d 472, 477-79 (2002) (describing the
events following the chancery court's 1994 ruling).
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provisions and purportedly changed the constitutional standard for public
school funding.228
In 1996, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied the state's appeal of the
chancery court's constitutional and equitable findings, holding that there
was not a final order for it to review due to the two-year stay allowed by
Chancellor Imber.229  Also in 1996, the plaintiffs in Lake View I filed
amended complaints alleging that the legislature's 1995 attempts to comply
with the Lake View I court order were themselves unconstitutional and did
not remedy the unconstitutionality of the school funding system. 230 Before
the trial court held a full trial on the State's compliance with the trial court's
1994 order, however, the legislature enacted a new system of funding and
set out what a "general, suitable, and efficient system of education should
include., 23' The plaintiffs filed another series of amended complaints
alleging that the new 1997 legislation was also violative of the Arkansas
Constitution's equal protection and education provisions.232 In 1998, the
trial court entered its final order, finding the plaintiffs amended complaint
moot and effectively dismissing the suit.
233
On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court in 2000, the court remanded
the case back to the trial court for a factual hearing to determine whether the
state's 1995 and 1997 changes and the 1997 constitutional amendment were
sufficient to correct the constitutional violations.234 The court did not
conduct its own constitutional analysis de novo in part because there were
no factual findings on the 1995 and 1997 legislation with which it could
compare against the state constitutional standard.235 Thus, the court found
that a compliance trial on these factual issues was necessary for sufficient
judicial review of the state policies.
In sanctioning the continuing jurisdiction asserted by the trial court
over the constitutionality of a state policy rather than on a specific challenge
228. Lake View V, 351 Ark. at 43-46, 91 S.W.3d at 477-79; Lake View III, 340 Ark. at
485-89, 490-91, 10 S.W.3d at 894-96, 898; BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 321.
229. Lake View I, 323 Ark. at 697, 917 S.W.2d at 533.
230. Lake View 111, 340 Ark. at 485, 10 S.W.3d at 895 (discussing Lake View fl).
231. Id. at 488, 10 S.W.3d at 896 (describing Act 1307 of 1997 and Act 1361 of 1997).
232. Id. at 488, 10 S.W.3d at 896 (discussing Lake View fl).
233. Id. at 491-92, 10 S.W.3d at 898-99 (discussing Lake View fl).
234. Id. at 495, 10 S.W.3d at 900; see also BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 8, at 322.
235. See Lake View III, 340 Ark. at 492-94, 10 S.W.3d at 899-900. The court also
expressed its unwillingness to affirm a lower court's decision on the grounds of mootness
because the decision could be "viewed as binding precedent on the issue of whether the 1995
and 1997 legislative acts and Amendment 74 corrected the disparities in pupil expenditures
and pupil opportunities." Id. at 494,10 S.W.3d at 900. Such a precedent could then bar
future challenges to "the constitutionality of the funding system based on [those] changes"
and defeat the effectiveness of an ongoing compliance review. Id. at 494, 10 S.W.3d at 900.
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to a state law,236 the court expressly authorized a new mechanism of active
constitutional review on the actions of the legislative and executive
branches: the compliance trial.237 As articulated by the Lake View line of
cases, a compliance trial allows the courts to retain jurisdiction over a state
policy challenge in order to continue evaluating the constitutionality of the
laws enacted since the court's determination that the policy was invalid, and
determine whether those laws have cured the unconstitutional infirmities
that the trial court initially found.238
As shown by its subsequent decisions, the Arkansas Supreme Court is
willing to become involved in the political process through a de novo
constitutional and policy review once sufficient factual findings have been
made regarding the compliance of the state's policies and laws with
constitutional requirements.239  Thus, compliance trials involve a
comprehensive judicial review of state policies from the trial court all the
way to the Arkansas Supreme Court in an active and ongoing review of the
policies enacted by the legislative and executive branches.
As Justice Tom Glaze observed in his dissenting opinion in Lake View
III, however, the compliance trial model represents a departure from the
limited role that the Arkansas Supreme Court had previously used in such
circumstances.240 Citing the court's decision in DuPree, which involved a
nearly identical case reviewing the constitutionality of the state's funding
system for public schools, Justice Glaze noted that the court's precedent
specifically set a limit on the ability of the court to address such
constitutional issues, namely, to merely determine whether the trial court
committed "prejudicial legal error" in its constitutional analysis, and leave
to the legislature the "difficult and perilous quest" of searching for "tax
equity.",241 Thus, under this limitation, where "no such error occurred, [the
court] must affirm the trial court's judgment, leaving the matter of achieving
a constitutional system to the body equipped and designed to perform that
function.
242
236. The trial court did more than merely assert jurisdiction over a future judicial
proceeding. Rather, Chancellor Imber introduced the compliance trial model itself by staying
her decision for two years in order to allow the state an opportunity to correct the
unconstitutionality of the funding system and "implement a funding system in conformity
with [her] opinion." See id. at 502, 10 S.W.3d at 905 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 501, 10 S.W.3d at 904.
238. Id. at 501, 10 S.W.3d at 904.
239. See, e.g., Lake View V, 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002); infra notes 245-46 and
accompanying text.
240. Lake View Ii, 340 Ark. at 501, 10 S.W.3d at 904 (Glaze, J., dissenting). Justice
Lavenski Smith also wrote a separate opinion on the issue of mootness because he found "no
authority in Arkansas law for a compliance trial." Id. at 500, 10 S.W.3d at 904 (Smith, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
241. Id. at 501-02, 10 S.W.3d at 904-05 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 502, 10 S.W.3d at 905 (emphasis omitted).
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More pointedly, Justice Glaze observed that the Arkansas Supreme
Court's cases have "never sanctioned a procedure whereby a trial court, after
ruling a statute unconstitutional, could retain jurisdiction of the case until
the General Assembly enacts a new measure the trial court believes meets
constitutional muster," and the majority opinion cites to no such case to
support such a proposition.243 Instead, the majority asserted that the "best
way" to determine "whether the disparities in treatment noted in the 1994
order have been corrected so as to pass constitutional muster" was to use a
compliance trial model.244 In sanctioning such so-called compliance trials,
however, it seems that the court involved itself in the policy-making process
in a way that the court had never before done.
On remand back to the trial court to conduct the compliance trial, the
chancery court (now presided over by Judge Collins Kilgore) again found
the public school funding system unconstitutional, this time as a violation of
both the education article and the due process protections of the Arkansas
Constitution. 24' In the years following this 2001 decision, the Arkansas
Supreme Court conducted at least twenty-one further reviews and
proceedings as part of the compliance trial process.246
243. Id. at 502, 10 S.W.3d at 905. For its part, the trial court did cite to a Montana case
for the authority to issue a stay and retain jurisdiction over the implementation of a funding
system in conformity with the trial court's opinion. Id. at 503 n.7, 10 S.W.3d at 905 n.7.
Yet, as Justice Glaze argues, the trial court appears to have had no authority to order such a
stay under Arkansas law. Id. at 502-03, 10 S.W.3d at 905 (citing to contrary authority under
ARK. R. CIV. P. 62(a); ARK. R. App. P.-Ctv. 8; Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Sutton, 305 Ark.
374, 807 S.W.2d 909 (1991)).
244. Lake View 111, 340 Ark. at 494, 10 S.W.3d at 900 (majority opinion). Without such
a compliance trial in this case, the court argued, "we are loathe to conclude that mere changes
in the school funding system warrant a dismissal." Id. at 494, 10 S.W.3d at 900.
245. Lake View School Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, No. 1992-5318, at *1 (Ark. May 25,
2001) (finding that that the new system was inequitable and inadequate under article II,
sections 2, 3, and 18, and article XIV, section 1).
246. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 370 Ark. 139, 257 S.W.3d 879
(2007); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 368 Ark. 231, 243 S.W.3d 919 (2006);
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 364 Ark. 398, 220 S.W.3d 645 (2005); Lake View
Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 364 Ark. 57, 216 S.W.3d 129 (2005); Lake View Sch. Dist.
No. 25 v. Huckabee, 363 Ark. 379, 214 S.W.3d 810 (2005); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v.
Huckabee, 363 Ark. 198, 211 S.W.3d 543 (2005); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee,
362 Ark. 520, 210 S.W.3d 28 (2005); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 362 Ark.
251, 208 S.W.3d 93 (2005); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 359 Ark. 49, 194
S.W.3d 193 (2004); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 358 Ark. 137, 189 S.W.3d 1
(2004); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 357 Ark. 274, 161 S.W.3d 787 (2004);
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 356 Ark. 587, 157 S.W.3d 192 (2004); Lake View
Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 356 Ark. 5, 145 S.W.3d 382 (2004); Lake View Sch. Dist.
No. 25 v. Huckabee, 356 Ark. 1, 144 S.W.3d 741 (Ark. 2004); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25
v. Huckabee, 355 Ark. 617, 142 S.W.3d 643 (2004); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v.
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Perhaps the most important of these subsequent decisions came on
appeal from the 2001 decision of Judge Kilgore.247 In this appeal, the
Arkansas Supreme Court expressly articulated for the first time the
constitutional authority for its involvement in the state's education policy.
248
Rejecting the state's argument that the school-funding system was a
nonjusticiable issue, the court held that the judiciary had an affirmative
constitutional duty to ensure that public education was adequately provided
pursuant to the state constitution's requirements and that duty required the
Arkansas Supreme Court to review school funding, including revenues and
expenditures per pupil.
249
The court based this finding on the Arkansas Constitution's current
language: "the State shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient
system of free public schools and shall adopt all suitable means to secure to
the people the advantages and opportunities of education., 250  After
comparing this language to previous versions of the education article that
provided that only the General Assembly was responsible for public
education, the court concluded that the current language was significant and
expanded responsibility for ensuring the adequacy of public education to
include all "departments of state govemment"-including the judiciary.25'
Pursuant to this authority, the court affirmed Judge Kilgore's finding that
Amendment 74 and the state's post-1994 legislation were insufficient to
address the constitutional deficiencies in the state's school funding system
under both the Arkansas Constitution's education-"adequacy" requirements
and equal protection provisions.252
The court also reconciled its previous school-funding decision in
DuPree with this authority by finding that DuPree stood for the proposition
that the legislature and the judiciary have complementary roles relative to
school funding.253 Implicit to this finding was the understanding that
Huckabee, 355 Ark. 501, 139 S.W.3d 809 (2004); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee,
2004 Ark. LEXIS 814 (Jan. 8, 2004); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark.
385, 94 S.W.3d 340 (2002); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View P), 351
Ark. 31, 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 349 Ark. 116, 76
S.W.3d 250 (2002).
247. Both the prevailing party (Lake View) and the State filed appeals. Lake View V, 351
Ark. at 45-46, 91 S.W.3d at 479. Among the issues raised by Lake View was the "failure of
the trial court to order specific remedies" to correct the unconstitutional school system. Id. at
46, 91 S.W.3d at 479. This decision represented the first, full appellate decision reviewing
the 2001 Kilgore decision. The Arkansas Supreme Court's prior orders and rulings leading
up to this review are set out in Lake View, 349 Ark. 116, 76 S.W.3d 250.
248. Lake View V, 351 Ark. at 51-53, 91 S.W.3d at 482-85.
249. Id at 53, 91 S.W.3d at 484 (citing ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1).
250. Id. at 52-53, 91 S.W.3d at 484.
251. Id. at 53, 91 S.W.3d at 484.
252. Id. at 79, 91 S.W.3d at 501.
253. Id. at 52, 91 S.W.3d at 483.
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DuPree did not necessarily limit the court's involvement in public education
policy, but rather established its specific role in public education policy.
Although this interpretation of the court's role is not expressly at odds with
the DuPree decision, there is a palpable tension between the holding in
DuPree that underscored the Arkansas Supreme Court's limited role in
education policy and the holding in the Lake View cases that authorized the
court's active involvement in evaluating the sufficiency of education
funding and expenditures on students, as well as the sufficiency of the
education provided by individual school districts and the State's education
policies.
This tension arises from the court's statement in DuPree that it "[was]
not now engaged in-nor.., about to undertake-the 'search for tax
equity.' ' 254 Rather, the court held that it had a limited role in "maintaining a
general, suitable and efficient school system" because the ultimate
responsibility for meeting this standard fell upon the "State. 255 Although
the court had not yet announced its role in determining "State"
responsibilities for public education that are described above, the court
appeared to separate itself from the part of the "State" that had ultimate
responsibility for public education and limited itself to reviewing the equal
protection findings of the trial court for "prejudicial legal error., 256 Yet a
few years later in Lake View V, the court enthusiastically embraced its
"State" role in this area and actively engaged in precisely the review of tax
equity and student education details that the court in DuPree disclaimed. 7
254. DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 349-50, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95 (1983)
(quoting Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 946 n.38 (Cal. 1976)).
255. Id. at 349, 651 S.W.2d at 95.
256. Id. at 345-50, 651 S.W.2d at 93-95.
257. See Lake View V, 351 Ark. at 70-78, 91 S.W.3d at 495-500. This apparently new
level of judicial review is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the court's detailed review of
the state revenues paid to local school districts, the actual expenditures spent on the students,
and the quality of education provided by Arkansas's public schools. For example, the court
effectively announced that tax equity was subordinate to the Arkansas Constitution's mandate
for adequate public education in its equal protection analysis. See id. at 79, 91 S.W.3d at 500
(discussion of equality under equal protection). The court explained this subordination in
part by observing that the touchstone of education is reflected by the actual expenditures
spent on students. See id. at 73, 91 S.W.3d at 496. Expenditures in turn necessarily implicate
the taxation equities among and between school districts because expenditures under the
then-current system were based on the locality's tax base. See id. at 73, 91 S.W.3d at 496. In
addition, the court evaluated the quality of education provided by Arkansas's public schools
and found that the "State" did not fulfill its absolute constitutional duty to provide an
adequate school-funding system because of the remaining deficiencies in Arkansas's public
education system. Id. at 54-70, 91 S.W.3d at 485-95. Even without an official evaluation by
one of the political branches, the court went on to describe a litany of educational deficiencies
in Arkansas's public schools. Id. at 56-63, 91 S.W.3d at 486-90. In these ways, the court
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As described above, the court has also become involved in a number of
other important social issues including adoption policies, criminal law, and
gay rights.25 8 It must be noted, of course, that the court's particular brand of
involvement in education funding policy is likely a special case because of
the Arkansas Constitution's detailed emphasis on education and the
constitutional duty that the court identified for the judiciary in providing
public education. 25 9 As the court observed in its 2002 Lake View opinion,
"[e]ducation has been a constitutional focus and mandate since the founding
of our state., 260 In contrast, it is not clear whether other subjects, such as
budget challenges, would achieve a similar level of involvement or interest
by the court. Yet, the court's willingness to become involved in public
policy, at least to the extent of education policy and the other important
social issues described above, evidences a widespread involvement at the
intersection of constitutional law and public policy that I argue help explain
the declining levels of popular interest in constitutional development to the
extent that the Arkansas Supreme Court's role in the constitutional process
has been adopted into the State's political culture.
C. The Evaluation of the Sufficiency of Constitutional-Initiative Proposals
The third area in which Arkansas Supreme Court has expanded its role
in the constitutional process is the court's increasing involvement in
evaluating the ballot sufficiency of initiative-based amendment proposals
before they reach voters at the polls. 261 This development can best be seen
by examining the number of challenges to constitutional initiatives that have
reached the court262 since the initiative power was first adopted in 1910.
affirmatively involved itself in the "search for tax equity" that its decision in DuPree
disavowed but that its decision in Lake View V accepted.
258. See, e.g., Dep't of Human Servs. v. Howard, 367 Ark. 55, 238 S.W.3d 1 (2006);
Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002); Sullivan 111, 348 Ark. 647, 74 S.W.3d
215 (2002); see also supra Part V.A.
259. See Lake View V, 351 Ark. at 51-55, 91 S.W.3d at 482-85 (regarding justiciability);
id. at 64-72, 91 S.W.3d at 490-95 (regarding the court's constitutional duty).
260. Id. at 64, 91 S.W.3d at 491 (tracking the constitutional history of education in
Arkansas through its previous and current constitutions). While the court also discussed in
dicta whether education as a fundamental right of citizens could be a basis for its opinion, the
court ultimately found it unnecessary to resolve the issue because of the State's "absolute
duty to educate our children." Id. at 67-71, 91 S.W.3d at 492-95. The court also noted that
where the State fails in that duty, "judicial scrutiny in subsequent litigation will, no doubt, be
as exact as it has been in the case before us." Id. at 67-71, 91 S.W.3d at 492-95.
261. I explore this development in greater detail in Jerald A. Sharum, Constitutional
Implementation and the Effectiveness of the Initiative Power in Arkansas (manuscript on file
with author).
262. The Arkansas Supreme Court holds original and exclusive jurisdiction to review the
ballot sufficiency of such proposals upon a challenge to the petition. ARK. CONST. amend.
VII, para. 21; see Thomas B. Cotton, Comment, The Arkansas Ballot Initiative: An Overview
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As Figure 11 shows, the court evaluated the sufficiency of at least
thirty-eight proposed constitutional amendments from 1912 to 2008.263
From these challenges, the court rejected at least twenty-four, that is, the
court rejected more than 63% of the initiative petitions that it considered
during this period.
and Some Thoughts on Reform, 53 ARK. L. REv. 759, 795-96 (2000).
263. These challenges include: Cox v. Daniels, 374 Ark. 437, _ S.W.3d _ (2008);
May v. Daniels, 359 Ark. 100, 194 S.W.3d 771 (2004); Ward v. Priest, 350 Ark. 462, 88
S.W.3d 416 (2002); Ward v. Priest, 350 Ark. 345, 86 S.W.3d 884 (2002); White v. Priest,
348 Ark. 783, 73 S.W.3d 572 (2002); Kurrus v. Priest, 342 Ark. 434, 29 S.W.3d 669 (2000);
Roberts v. Priest, 341 Ark. 329, 20 S.W.3d 376 (2000); Stilley v. Priest, 341 Ark. 329, 16
S.W.3d 251 (2000); Roberts v. Priest, 334 Ark. 503, 975 S.W.2d 850 (1998); League of
Women Voters of Ark. v. Priest, 334 Ark. 558, 975 S.W.2d 828 (1998); Scott v. Priest, 326
Ark. 328, 932 S.W.2d 746 (1996); Crochet v. Priest, 326 Ark. 338, 931 S.W.2d 128 (1996);
Donovan v. Priest, 326 Ark. 353, 931 S.W.2d 119 (1996); Parker v. Priest, 326 Ark. 123, 931
S.W.2d 108 (1996); Holt v. Priest, 327 Ark. 277, 930 S.W.2d 359 (1996); Parker v. Priest,
326 Ark. 123, 930 S.W.2d 322 (1996); Burge v. Priest, 326 Ark. 67, 928 S.W.2d 338 (1996);
Southland Racing Corp. v. Priest, 326 Ark. 1, 927 S.W.2d 338 (1996); Page v. McCuen, 318
Ark. 342, 884 S.W.2d 951 (1994); Bailey v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 277, 884 S.W.2d 938 (1994);
Christian Civic Action Comm. v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605 (1994); Plugge v.
McCuen, 310 Ark. 654, 841 S.W.2d 138 (1992); Finn v. McCuen, 303 Ark. 418, 798 S.W.2d
34 (1990); Ferstl v. McCuen, 296 Ark. 504, 758 S.W.2d 398 (1988); Ark. Women's Political
Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 677 S.W.2d 846 (1984); Dust v. Riviere, 277 Ark. 1, 638
S.W.2d 663 (1982); Becker v. Riviere, 270 Ark. 219, 604 S.W.2d 555 (1980); Mason v.
Jernigan, 260 Ark. 385, 540 S.W.2d 851 (1976); McDonald v. Bryant, 238 Ark. 338, 381
S.W.2d 736 (1964); Moore v. Hall, 229 Ark. 411, 316 S.W.2d 207 (1958); Johnson v. Hall,
229 Ark. 404, 316 S.W.2d 197 (1958); Johnson v. Hall, 229 Ark. 400, 316 S.W.2d 194
(1958); Hoban v. Hall, 229 Ark. 416, 316 S.W.2d 185 (1958); Bradley v. Hall, 220 Ark. 925,
251 S.W.2d 470 (1952); Newton v. Hall, 196 Ark. 929, 120 S.W.2d 364 (1938); Hildreth v.
Taylor, 117 Ark. 465, 175 S.W.40 (1915); Grant v. Hardage, 106 Ark. 506, 153 S.W. 826
(1913); and State ex rel. City of Little Rock v. Donaghey, 106 Ark. 56, 152 S.W. 746 (1912).
As there is not a consolidated list of Arkansas Supreme Court challenges to proposed
constitutional amendments, however, the challenges identified in this Article were derived
from extensive research through LEXIS, Westlaw, and government sources in Arkansas. I
am also especially grateful for the help of Chief Justice Jim Hannah of the Arkansas Supreme
Court in researching this area.
Nevertheless, as a result of this limitation, my data may not include all such
challenges that were made.
In addition, as a matter of methodology, individual challenges that were bifurcated
to examine multiple issues, however, were not treated as separate challenges for the purposes
of this Article. See, e.g., Porter, 310 Ark. 674, 839 S.W.2d 521 (signature sufficiency);
Porter, 310 Ark. 562, 839 S.W.2d 512 (ballot title sufficiency). I did, however, include as
unique challenges each case that reached the Arkansas Supreme Court, even if more than one
case challenged the same proposed initiative.
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Figure 11: Constitutional Initiative Challenges by Outcome, 1912-2008
But as Figure 11 shows, the court also appears to have become
increasingly willing to invalidate proposed constitutional amendments.
Indeed, of the twenty-four proposed constitutional initiatives that the court
rejected, nearly 71% of them (seventeen) occurred in the last forty years,
and 82% of those (fourteen) occurred in the last fifteen years. Moreover,
from 1990 to 2000, the court rejected an astounding 83% (fifteen) of the
constitutional initiative petitions that it reviewed.26
At least one commentator has found that such removals by the
Arkansas Supreme Court, however appropriate to address ballot defects,
may infringe upon the means of the people "to ratify or reject important and
comprehensible questions of public government and morality" through the
amendment process.265 Moreover, this level of involvement in such a critical
element of Arkansas's constitutional process appears to be a departure from
264. Kurrus, 342 Ark. 434, 29 S.W.3d 669; Roberts, 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 376;
League of Women Voters ofArk., 334 Ark. 558, 975 S.W.2d 828; Roberts, 334 Ark. 503, 975
S.W.2d 850; Parker, 326 Ark. 386, 931 S.W.2d 108; Donovan, 326 Ark. 353, 931 S.W.2d
119; Crochet, 326 Ark. 338, 931 S.W.2d 128; Scott, 326 Ark. 328, 932 S.W.2d 746; Holt,
326 Ark. 277, 930 S.W.2d 359; Burge, 326 Ark. 67, 928 S.W.2d 338; Southland Racing
Corp., 326 Ark. 1, 927 S.W.2d 338; Page, 318 Ark. 342, 884 S.W.2d 951; Bailey, 318 Ark.
277, 884 S.W.2d 938; Christian Civic Action Comm., 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605; Finn,
303 Ark. 418, 798 S.W.2d 34.
265. See Cotton, supra note 262, at 802-04.
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the court's tradition of liberally construing the sufficiency of initiative-based
amendments in order to further the purpose of the Initiative and Referendum
Amendment to "reserve to the people the right to adopt, reject, approve, or
disapprove legislation.
266
In any event, it is clear that the court's recent activity in acting as
gatekeeper to the exercise of popular constitutional activism has negatively
impacted the exercise of that right by reducing the number of potential
initiatives considered by the people. It is not hard to imagine how such a
gatekeeper might also effectively suppress popular constitutional activism in
other ways, such as by disincentivizing groups from developing initiatives
for fear of them being removed from the ballot by the court right before the
election.
V. CONCLUSION
Since its adoption in 1874, Arkansas's current constitution has been
under pressure to adjust to modem needs. Throughout Arkansas's history,
the people have exerted this pressure through an active role in the
constitutional process that has allowed them to use their constitutional
powers to effect social and governmental change. In the first twenty years
of the twentieth century, the people began to aggressively chart a new
course in constitutional governance with the passage of the initiative
amendments. These amendments greatly expanded upon the people's
powers of constitutional revision and ushered in dramatic increases in active
popular participation in the constitutional process by proposing
constitutional amendments that restrained their government (or freed their
government from prior constitutional restrains) and advanced constitutional
reform.
Indeed, the power of the people to propose constitutional amendments
by initiative has been a powerful force in Arkansas's constitutional law.
Since 1912, the people have proposed by initiative an astounding eighty-two
constitutional amendments over the course of 72% of possible elections.267
This amounts to over 45% of the 180 amendments that have been submitted
266. Id. at 762 (citing the court's recent rulings as inconsistent with the long-standing
doctrine of liberal construction that the Court has used in evaluating the sufficiency of
initiative petitions). Under this tradition, substantial compliance with the Initiative and
Referendum Amendment was all that was required of ballot sufficiency in order to ensure
that proposed amendments are not "thwarted by strict or technical construction" of initiative
requirements. Fletcher v. Bryant, 243 Ark. 864, 867, 422 S.W.2d 698, 700 (1968) (citing
Reeves v. Smith, 190 Ark. 213, 78 S.W.2d 72 (1935); Cochran v. Black, 240 Ark. 393, 400
S.W.2d 280 (1966); and Blocker v. Sewell, 189 Ark. 924, 75 S.W.2d 658 (1987)).
267. Infra app.l, tbl.l.
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to the people overall (including amendments proposed by the legislature)--a
level of direct popular involvement well above the national average of
10%.268 Although political forces in Arkansas have likely manipulated the
people's involvement, the initiative power and the people's frequent
utilization of it remain a testament to the people's dominant role in
Arkansas's constitutional process.
It is difficult to conceive of what Arkansas would be like today without
the people's consummate involvement because of the pervasive restrictions
on the powers and operations of the state government that the original 1874
Constitution imposed. Without constitutional amendment, these restrictions
would likely have remained in place today. Yet the people have chosen to
make the numerous and far-reaching changes and expansions of powers in
order to enable the state government to meet the changing needs of the
people and the modem administrative state. Thus, popular involvement in
the constitutional process has been essential in the development of both
constitutional law and the ability of the state to meet modem challenges, all
while maintaining the people's active hand in restraining government and
meeting the majority of the voting population's evolving social, moral, and
political needs.
I have defined this type of participation as popular constitutional
activism. I have measured it by the number of constitutional amendments
that are proposed by initiative in a given year because these initiatives are
the very instruments that the people have used to directly participate in the
constitutional process. A simple accounting of these amendments, however,
indicates that the level of popular constitutional activism has not been
constant throughout Arkansas's history. More importantly, this tradition of
activism appears to have undergone a rapid decline over the last four
decades. As this is the period of time that generally corresponds to the
Arkansas Supreme Court's increasing participation in the constitutional (and
political) process, the focus of this article has been to evaluate the extent to
which this tradition may have been affected by the increasing role of the
Arkansas Supreme Court in the constitutional process.
I have therefore attempted to statistically quantify this decline in order
to provide a means to measure the decline of popular constitutional activism
during the Arkansas Supreme Court's ascendancy. Based on this analysis, I
can make several statistical observations. First, there has been a statistically
significant decline in the level of popular constitutional activism from 1984
to 2006. Second, during this period, there is a high negative correlation
between the year and the number of amendments proposed by initiative that
268. Id; Gerald Benjamin, Constitutional Amendment and Revision, in AGENDA OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra note 186, at 181. ("Over the course of American history




allows the year variable to account for more than 48.7% of the variance in
the number of amendments proposed in a given year. The year variable
therefore appears to be an effective stand-in for the court's increasing role
because (1) a strong correlation between the year variable and the number of
initiative-based amendments proposed in a given year developed during the
same period in which the court's expansions occurred, and (2) that period
lacked other factors that previously distorted patterns of popular
constitutional activism.
By comparing these illuminating statistical observations with the
increasing role of the Arkansas Supreme Court in the constitutional process,
the ascendancy of the Arkansas Supreme Court provides a compelling
causal explanation for this decline. First, the coincident ascendancy of the
court with the decline of initiated amendments suggests that the court's
increasing role is an important and strongly influential factor in the level of
participation by the people in the constitutional process, and therefore, an
important factor in the level of popular constitutional activism. Second, the
court has expanded its constitutional role in three key areas visible to the
people: (1) the protection of individual rights based on the Arkansas
Constitution; (2) the court's ability and willingness to review important
cases and involve itself in public policy; and (3) the evaluation of the
sufficiency of constitutional initiative proposals. As described above,
although these changes provide a ready means to control state action to
protect individuals and become involved in important issues of the day, they
also allow the court to alter Arkansas's long-standing tradition of popular
constitutional activism and depress, both directly and indirectly, the people's
use of their primary instrument for effecting constitutional change: the
popular initiative.
Perhaps most tellingly, the decline in popular constitutional activism
and the increasing role of the Arkansas Supreme Court have occurred during
a period of relatively constant involvement by the people in elections
overall.269 Thus, the decline in popular constitutional activism does not
appear to be the result of popular disengagement of the electorate in so far
as voter turnout has remained relatively constant over the same period.27° In
269. United States Election Project, Voter Turnout,
http://elections.gmu.edu/voter-tumout.htm (follow "Turnout 1980-2008.xls" hyperlink)
[hereinafter Arkansas Election Data] (providing voter turnout data in Arkansas).
270. Measuring voter turnout reliably is problematic. United States Election Project,
Voter Turnout Frequently Asked Questions, http://elections.gmu.edu/FAQ.html. This is
because, beyond defining the population to be measured, a number of factors affect voter
turnout rates. For example, the content and context of a given election impact the rate at
which the voting population gets to the polls. This effect can be seen in presidential election
2009]
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addition, Arkansas's decline in initiative-based amendment proposals
coincides with an increase in such activism nationwide.27'
My analysis therefore suggests that the level of popular constitutional
activism has declined in the face of the rising constitutional influence of the
Arkansas Supreme Court and that the people are at least becoming more
content to allow the judiciary to take a more active role in the constitutional
process, effectively allowing the government of Arkansas to provide all of
the protections and government limitations that "the people" require. As
Professors Blair and Barth observed, "Arkansas voters have shown an
increased willingness in recent years to remove the shackles from their
governing institutions," but at the same time appear to increasingly see
litigation and the courts "as a means of changing public policy when
majoritarian institutions are nonresponsive to them., 272 With the people's at
least partial abdication of their traditional role as masters of Arkansas's
constitutional law and the Arkansas Supreme Court's increasing acceptance
of a more active role in developing state constitutional law and supervising
the constitutional process, perhaps the legislature should consider changing
the motto of the state from regnat populus, the people rule, to minus regnat
populus, the people rule less.
years where voter turnout is often higher than in non-presidential election years. Arkansas
Election, Data, supra note 269. Similarly, the presence of hot button social issues on ballot
measures in a given election year also influence voter turnout for that year one way or the
other. Yet when these factors are accounted for, the level of voter turnout is remarkably
constant.
There are, however, issues related to defining what part of the population is included
in the voter turnout calculation that often escape consideration. Voter Turnout FAQ, supra.
Because of these issues, I have used data corresponding to voting rate measurements for
persons eligible to vote in a given election in order to provide the most meaningful rate
measurements. Id.
271. See INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., INITIATIVE USE (2009),
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/IRI%20nitiative%2OUse%20%281904-2008%29.pdf
(indicating that the number of initiatives, both constitutional and statutory, have generally
increased from approximately 1966 to 2008).









273. There is currently no single, comprehensive source that provides accurate data on
amendments proposed by initiative or legislative referendum. As a result, the data relied on
in this article represents a compilation of data from several sources. The primary source was
Kay Collett Goss's reference guide on the Arkansas Constitution. Goss, supra note 15.
Where that source lacked coverage, additional sources were used to fill in the missing data,
including Arkansas Secretary of State, Election Results,
http://www.arelections.org/index.php?l=l (last visited Aug. 4, 2009); Arkansas Secretary of
State, Initiatives and Amendments from 1938-2006,
http://www.sosweb.state.ar.us/elections/electionspdfs/initiatives amendments_1938-
2006.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2009); INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., ARKANSAS,
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Totals 114 59 55 82 34 48
'isltivePopular Initiative
Year Popcq-rpsd Adopted Failed*
1874 0 -0
1972 0 0 0
1974 1 0 1
1976 220 0 0 0
1978 10 0 0
1980 21 0 1
1982 0 0 0
1984 4 1 3
1986 3 1 2
1988 2 1 1
1990 1 0 1
1992 1 1 0
1994 3 0 3
1996 2 1 1
1998 1 0 1
2000 1 0 1
2002 2 0 2
2004 1 1 0
2006 0 0 0
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df SS MS F F
Regression 1 6.097372992 6.097372992 1.872116406 0.1778793
Residual 46 149.8192937 3.256941167
Total 47 155.9166667
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 26.90823563 18.41941636 1.460862554 0.1508505
Year 0.012863656 0.009401518 1.368253049 0.1778793
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df SS MS F F
Regression 1 6.938811189 6.938811189 9.490674319 0.011626911
Residual 10 7.311188811 .731118881
Total 11 14.25
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 221.479021 71.32495168 3.10521095 0.011151248
Year -0.11013986 0.035751641 3.080693805 0.011626911

